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Most participants in this lively discussion agreed that we are not
likely to return to growth rates well over 2.5 percent in the me-
dium run - unless some policy yet to be defined emerges - and
that this slowdown will particularlv hurt developing countries.
There was a consensus that something must be done to stabilize
exchange rates.
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In January 1988 the International Economic  [after the war] with the rcsult that wage expecta-
Analysis and Prospects Division of the Intema-  tions became unrealistic relative to underlying
tional Economics Department held a one-day  productivity growth, with the result thzt wage
round table seminar on the prospects for eco-  earners and unions in many countries essentially
nomic  growth  in the  industrial  coantries  in the  forgot  that they  also had a kind of responsibility
1990s. Following are highlights from the  for what happened to real wages and thereby
discussion:  demand for labor.
Andrea Boltho:  Even if, in an ideal world,  Jean Baneth:  Growth is like a bicycle.  if it
Japanese savings ought to be exported to Latin  slows down too much, it may fall.  And I
America, we are not in that ideal world: we are  personally believe that hecause of both political
in the presence of major imbalances. whatever  and social restraints, as you fall below or try ,o
intertemporal shifting might lead one to expect.  stay at 2.5 percent, the long-term outcome may
Is it, iherefore, inevitable that the next few years  in fact be much slower growth.
(1989-91) will see a recession?  And if we see a
recession, will it be coupled with inflation - or  Leslie Lipschitz:  One of the problems
will we at least be able to avoid one or the other  might well be that Americans understand very
of these two possibilities?  little of the problems of Europe and are not
persuasive in talking about Europe, i  I suspect
What would bring us to a higher growth  vice versa -that  sometime when one listens to
rate? The only thir,g that the Fund has to  this debate, it sounds like a dialogue of the deaf.
recommend is policies of deregulation. Frankly,
I am far from convinced. For one thing, the  Steve Marris:  None of our models take into
1950s and the 1960s were almost certainly a  account the interreaction between price elas.ici-
period in which regulations increased, in which  ties and income elasticities.  You know, what
the Welfare State became more "oppressive," in  every other country has learned is that if you
which labor legislation got more binding. Yet  combine an undervalued exchange rate with r
our growth went on and on and on, apparently  recession, miracles happen.  They happened in
unperturbed.... it doesn't  look as if these micro  Brazil; they happened in Mexico; they used to
distortions were quite as important as people  happen from time to time in France.  There is
tried to make them out to be. [On the other hand,  every likelihood that they could happen in the
one kind of deregulation] has had extremely  United States.
serious negative consequences for our growth
perfornance:  deregulated [foreign] exchange  I suppose what we need is a crisis serious
markets.  enough [that we can] lock the govemments into
a better managed exchange rate system, but not
Fleinminzg  Larsen,:  Expansionary fiscal  so serious that the whole thing brcaks down and
pDlicies  perhaps  w"erc  pursued a bit too long  there is nothing left to manage.
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(i)INTERNATIONAL  ECONOMICS  ANALYSIS AND  PROSPECTS  DIVISION
PREFACE
In  January  1988,  the  International  Economic  Analysis  and  Prospects  Division
(IECAP)  of  the International  Economics  Department,  as  a part of its  ongoing
research  activity  on global  prospects,  held a one-day,  informal,  round-table
seminar  to evaluate  various  views  concerning  prospects  for economic  growth  in
the  Industrial  countries  during  the  decade  of the  1990s.  The  seminar  was  titled:
Can  The  Industrial  Countries  Return  To Rapid  Growth?
This  volume  contains  the  main  body  of the  discussions  chat  took  place  at
that  seminar. The  participants,  whose  name  list  appears  below,  were  invited  by
Mr.  Jean Baneth,  Director  of International  Economics  Department,  from a cross
section  of international  organizations  and private  research  institutes. The
meeting  was held  at the  Bank  and  was  chaired  by Mr.  Baneth.
The  following  set  of background  papers  were  sent to each invitee,  prior
to the  meeting,  in  order  to  help  organize  the  discussions  around  a  given  theme:
Andrea  Boltho,  Can  We Return  to  RaDid  Growth?,  Division  Working  Paper  No.
1987-4,  IECAP,  World  Bank,  December  1987;  subsequently  a revised  version
of this  paper  has  been  released  as  a  PPR  Working  Paper,  WPS  9,  World  Bank,
June 1988.
World  Bank,  World  Development  Report  1988, Draft,  December  1987.
Paul  Armington  and  Shahrokh  Fardoust,  a  C.omment  on  the  Outlook  in  the  Light
of  Professor  Boltho's  Paper,  mimeographed,  IECAP,  World  Bank,  January  1988;
a  revised  and  updated  version  this  paper,  retitled  Long-Term  Prospects  for
the  World  Economy,  will soon  be released  by  IECAP.
The  editing  has  been  kept  to  a  minimum,  and  what  is  reported  here  is  nearly
identical  to  the  actual  deliberations  during  the  meeting.  Nevertheless,  in  order
for  the  document  to  be  more  readable,  three  types  of  changes  have  been  introduced
to the  original  document,  which  was  based  on the  sound  recording  of the  seminar.
All  discussijns  not  directly  concerned  with  the  main cheme  have  been taken  out;
unfinished  or incoherent  sentences  have  been  edited,  .nainly  by the  participants
themselves;  other  changes  have  been  put  in  brackets  [  J;  and,  finally,  an  attempt
has  been  made to identify  the  sources  of some  of the  items  that  were referred
to  by the  participants  at the  meeting  (i.e.,  reports,  published  scholarly  arti-
cles,  etc.).  The result  is a document  that  contains  a number  of interesting
and  stimulating  discussions  about  the  major  global  economic  issues  in  the  context
of the  long-term  prospects  for  the  industrial  economies.  We hope  that  this,  and
other  similar  produccs  planned  for  future  release,  will be found  useful  by the
Bank  staff.
The initial  editing  and  the  arrangement  of  the  text  were done bv
Shahrokh  Fardoust;  Jacquelyn  Queen  was  responsible  for the  word processing  and
the  production  of the  document.
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PROCEEDINGS
PAR  T r1
(Morning  session  lO:am)
MR.  BANETH:  The  main  document  around  which  I  would  like
to  structure  the  meeting  is  Professor  Boltho's  attempt  at describing
the  constraints  on  growth  and  what  he sees  as the  means  for  acceler-
ating  it in the industrial  countries;  and the  economic,  social  and
political  implications  for the developing  countries  if we could
accelerate  growth,  or indeed  if it  slows  further.
Can  We  Return  to  PROF.  BOLTHO:  I don't  expect  any  of you to have  read
Rapid  Grovth  my paper  because  it  is immensely  long. So I  will briefly  summarize
it  first  and  then  mention  some  of the  possible  issues  which  we mighc
discuss  this  morning  and  this  afternoon. The  paper  is  an attempt  at
seeing  what the  constraints  on long-term  growth  may be.  It takes  a
historical  approach. It  goes  back in time  quite  far.
It  makes  a very  convenient  assumption  at the  outset  which
is to ignore  virtually  all the  real  important  problems. The issues
of the  dollar,  of the  deficits,  of the  imbalances,  of debt  are  swept
under  the  counter,  which  is  very  convenient,  but  obviously  dangerous,
and it concentrates  on the  conditions  for rapid  growth  thereafter.
In other  words,  it assumes  that in some  way or another  we will be
able to get  out  of the  present  mess in a non-defined  time  horizon,
five  years, eight years,  possibly twenty-five  years.
And  it  says,  well,  let's  assume  that  we can  get  out  of the
various  imbalances  which  beset  the  world  economy  today,  can  we then
get back  to a  growth  trend  that  is  about  the  2 to  2-1/2  percent  per
annum  that  we have been  experiencing  since  the  second  oil  shock?
Now  I admit  that  while  it  is  convenient,  it is  a  dangerous
assumption  if only  because  the  transition,  the  way in which  we gec
out  of  present  day  imbalances  will  color  the  future  growth  prospects
of the  world.
The ocher  assumption  which  I make, in looking  at longer-
term  g,owth, is  a very  simple one --  a justified one --  which is chat
investment  is the main engine of long-term  growth.  It is when
investment  accelerates  that  growth  accelerates  as  well. For  individ-
ual countries,  exports  can  take  that  role;  exports  can be an engine
of  growth,  but  I am not interested  in the  experience  of individual
countries. I  am interested  in the  experience  of  all the  industrial-
ized  countries  at  the  same  tirie.
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The  reasons  why  I  am such  a strong  believer  in the  virtues
of investment  are spelled  out in the  paper.  And, in turn,  invest-
ment,  which determines  longer-term  growth  is strongly  linked  with
technological  progress,  and  is  a  function  of  optimistic  expectations.
be these  of profits  or be Liese  of future  demand. I don't  want co
enter  into the  Keynesian  v .sus  Neo-classical  controversy. I just
say that,  in  fact,  the  two  tend  to  be correlated  over the  cycle  and
over the  medium-run  anyway.
Therefore,  it is optimistic  expectations  that generate
upswings  in investment,  and it is upswings  in investment,  in turn,
which  lead  to  acceleration  (or  deceleracions  in  the  opposite  case)  in
the  growth  path  of the  world  economy.
What  are these  expectations  function  of?  Well,  there  the
field is more open,  as far as I am concerned. There  are various
views  on what may  generate  favorable  expectations.  One of chem  is
the idea that we are subject to virtually  inevitable  cycles in
optimism,  pessimism,  investment  activity  and so on,  which  have  gone
under  the  name  of Kondratieff  cycles.
rmportance  of  But there are two other views which I  think are more
System  Shocks  interesting,  one  of  which  would  stress  the  importance  of deregulated
markets  and spontaneous  market  forces,  very  much the  present  policy
orthodoxy  in  stimulating  entrepreneurial  activities.  The  other  one,
on the  other  hand,  would  stress  what I call  system  shocks,  but  I do
not only want to call them system  shocks,  special impulses  which
appear  from  time  to  time,  often  in  an  ad  hoc  way,  which  can  come  from
wars, from change  in trading  regimes,  but also importantly  from
economic  policies.
So it is really  between  these  two, in a sense,  opposite
views,  I think,  that  the  debate  may  be placed.
What does the empirical  evidence  show, if anything?  I
don't think  it shows  that  much.  It shows  what Paul Armington  and
Shahrokh  Fardoust  call  in thelr  paper  the  sort  of ineluctability  of
2-1/2  percent  per  annum. If  I take  the  Angus  Maddison's  data  for 16
industrialized  countries [see Phases of Capitalist  Development,
Oxford  University,  Press,  19821,  which  go back  at  least  a century  and
possibly  a bit  more,  one  finds  that  indeed  over  most  of the  time  che
growth rate of industrialized  countries  has been roughly 2-1/2
percent  per  annum.
And I have trled  with a certain  amount  of ingenuity.  I
think,  to  find  periods  of acceleration  and  deceleration  within  this
long-run  historical  experience  and  basically,  apart  from the  obvious
1950s  and 1960s,  which  are a clear  exception  to the  general trend
because  of  very  sharp  sudden  acceleration,  I  can  at  best  come  up  with
two periods  of very mild acceleration  in the 1850s  and 1860s and
again  at the  end  of the  19th  century. The  accelerations  are  mild;3
the  periods  are very  removed. The lessons,  thorefore,  we can draw
from  them  may  be very  limited.
In the choice among:  Kondratieff,  spontaneous  market
forces,  and system  shocks  (whlch  I don't  test  econometricaUy)  --  I
dismiss  Kondratleff  if only because  I find very little  regularity
that  one  can  observe  in the  cycles. There  miay  be some  price  regular-
ities,  but  clearly  it  is  not  quantity  regularity.
In any  case,  none  of the  explanatlons  I have come  across
for the  presumed  regularity  of such  cycles  seem  to hold  much  water.
Between,  these  sort of shorthand  titles  of spontaneous
market  forces  versus  system  shocks,  I  find  that  at best  the  "spontan-
eous school",  a sort of dercgulated  market school, can no doubt
provide  some  explanation  for  the  Industrial  Revolution  of  Britain  in
the  18th  Century,  and  possibly  for  the  acceleration  of the  1850s  and
1860s.  By the turn  of the century  already,  I think  the role of
economic  policies  but  also  possibly  of gold  discoveries  and  colonial
adventures  becomes  more important,  and possibly  also protectionism
becomes  more important. For the '50s  and '60s  my reading  of the
evidence  (biased  as it may be) is strongly  in support  of the idea
that  economic  policies  played  an extremely  important  role.
Physical  factors  were  no doubt  permissive,  but similarly
permissive  physical  factors  that  exissted  in  prior  periods  of  economic
history  --  abundant  labor,  cheap  technology,  cheap  energy  --  had  not
generated  super  rates  of  growth  of  the  order  of  magnitude  of  4-1/2  to
5  percent. What  was  different  on this  occasion,  to  my mind,  was  the
much  greater  role  that  government  policies  were  taking  in  preserving
employment,  preventing  business  cycles  and,  in  many  countries,  trying
to  accelerate  growth.
And  my  view that  system  shocks  matter  is  also  confirmed  in
a  paper  by  Reynolds  in  the  Journal  of  Economic  Literature  [June  1987,
pp.  649-698]  on the  experience  of  developing  countries,  again  a  long-
run  brush  history  of developing  countries  --  which  suggests  that  for
virtually  all those  developing  countries  which shifted  the  growth
tempo  from  a fairly  steady  to  an acceleration  of  growth  tempo,  to  a
much  more  rapid  growth  in  per  capita  incomes,  this  is  associated  with
exports  on the  one  hand  but  with  some  political  shock  or other  on the
other. So the  real  system  shocks  doesn't  seem  to  be  applicable  only
to  my  very  broad  brush  vie^v  of the  industrialized  countries'  acceler-
ations  through  time,  but  could  also  fit  individual  experience  --  not
as a group,  bur  of individual  experience  - - of a large  number of
developing  countries  which  Reynolds  looked  at in  detail.
The  Supply-  So  much  for  the  past. Now  what  aboc_t  the  futu.'e?  Does  anv
Side...  of this  suggest  thac  we are  stuck  with  a  2-1/2  percenc  or even less
growth  forever? Or  does  any  of this  suggest  that  we could  return  to
a faster  growth  rate  of output  and  activity  at some  future  dace?4
One issue  that  often  preoccupies  economists  is the  issue
of  whether  the  supply  would  be  there. Could  the  Industrial  countries
(once  ve  get rid  of the  U.S.  deficits  and so on)  actually  grow at 4
percent? Is the  labor  there? Is the  capital  there? Is  the  technol-
ogy  there? Are  the  savings  there? My biased  conclusion  is  that  most
of these  problems  have  been  overstated.
On  the  labor  front,  I  would  have thought  that  there  was  a
fair  amount  of  avallable  labor  In  most  of  our  economies.  I  mean,  the
United  States  today  may be an exceptlon  in that  It Is  close  to  full
employment;  but then the  growth  problem  is more an European  and,
perhaps,  Japanese  problem  than  It is  an  American  problem,  at least  ac
present.  In Western  Europe  in  particular,  to my mind, there  are
ample  supplies  of labor. Take  the  British  example,  as  a case  for  an
extremely  rigid  labor  market. In Britain,  the  natural  unemployment
had risen par  _  Passu  with the actual unemployment,  to about 3
million. Over the  last  year,  British  growth  has  been  very  rapid  by
international  standards.  Unemployment  has  fallen rapidly and
sharply,  and there  have been  no upward  pressures  on wages.  Wages
have  grown  rapidly  but  they  were  growing  already  beforehand  while  the
British  economy  was not  growing  rapidly. There  has been  no upward
Inflationary  pressure  and  labor  has  been  reabsorbed  into  the  economy.
On the capital  side, there  may be need for a bit more
caution,  if only because  ten or fifteen  years of slow  growth  have
led to a  shortfall of  investment and hence  to capacity  problems.
Again,  Britain  doesn't  seem  to  be  evidencing  these  capacity  problems,
nor Japan, whose growth has also accelerated  significantly  --
apparently  thanks  to a fiscal  boost.  But the rates of capacity
utilization  at  present,  for  instance,  do  not  suggest  that  the  margins
of spare  capacity  are  as large  as one  might  have expected  after  ten
or fifteen  years  of slow  growth.
Nonetheless,  my  prudence  ought  to  be  colored  by experience
of the  1950s  and  1960s,  for  instance,  when  we  were  running  very  close
to  full  capacity  utilization.  Capacity  was  fully  utilized  in  all  the
OECD  economies  for  a long-run  of  years. Yet,  we  could  go on  growing
at 4 to  5  percent. Demand  just  created  its  investment  needs  and  the
capacity  that  went  with  it. With  the  large  margins  of  spare  capacity
we  have  now,  one  would  think  that  the  scope  for  expansion  was there.
And,  as expansion  took  place,  because  of the  accelerator  mechanisms,
the  investment  would  then  follow.
Raw  On the  raw  materials'  side,  I would  doubt  that there  can
materials...  be very  many  problems  for  p;imary  products  other  than  oil.  And  even
for oil, I would have thought  the  chances  of OPEC sharply  raising
prices  again  are remote  unless  we really  were to accelerate  to an
inconceivably  rapid  growth  rate, to 4 or 5 percent  for ten  years.
Then,  no doubt,  we  might  face  problems  in the  oil  market  again. But
this is clearly  not on the cards.  And perhaps  influenced  by the
present  oil  market  situation,  I  predict  that  oil  will  not  be a  major
constraint  on future  growch.
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On the  physical  slde,  the  other  Issue  often  mentioned  Is
technology.  We all thlnk  that  technology  Is frightfully  Important,
but  we don't  know  how to  measure  It.  We don't  know whether  it is
there or not.  Casual empiriclsm  and journalistic  reports  will
suggest that there Is plenty of  technoloS;'  available.  We are
innovating  in  robots  and  flexible  manutacturing  systems,  electronics,
telecommunicatlons,  etc. But  I am  not  sure  that  that  cuts  much  Ice.
Scientific  a-.d  Whether  we  would  be  hittlng  problems  on the  Innovation,  In
Technological  the  technology  froutler  Is  --  to  my  mind,  an  open  Issue. I  am  struck
Factors...  by  some  of the  evidence  I  have  seen  w'hlch  suggests  that  even  techno-
logical  innovations  are  strongly  Influenced  by the  pace  and  the  spesd
of demand  Itself. The  application  of Inventions  tend  to follow  th.
cycle,  Investment,  and  seem  to  be a function  of demand  forces.
So that  if we were able to accelerate  a bit, technology
may well adapt  to the  acceieration,  just as when a relatlvely  low
output  growth  may  be leading  to  a relatively  low  rate  of Innovation
and  structural 4ange.
All these are Izally  types of physical  bottlenecks  --
labor,  capital,  raw  materials  and technology. But there  are some
less physical  bottlenecks. One such bottleneck  is savings.  The
possibility  that  even  If  we did  wish  to invest,  and even  if  ootimis-
tic  expectations  materialized,  we  would  be  hitting  an  availability  of
savings  bottleneck,  whLch  would  drive  up  interest  rates  and/or  infla-
tion  and  therefore  frustrate  the  attempt  at  growing  at  a  faster  rate.
True  to  my  unreconscructed  Keynesianism,  I  consider  savings
to  be  a function  of income. And  If income  grows,  savings  grow.  But
I  must  admit  that  the  recent  U.S.  experience  has  thrown  some  doubt  in
my mind  about  the  universal  validity  of this  proposition.
Looking at past experiences  of acceleration  in growth
rates,  virtually  anywhere  higher  savings  followed.  This seems to
have  been the  case  even  for the  Uniced  States  through  the  1950s  and
the 1960s.  But in the  early  1980s,  United  States  investment  grew
rapidly,  Government  expenditure,  of course,  grew rapidly  as well,
while  savings,  despite  rapid  income  growth,  did  not  follow  suit,  and
hence  you  had the  well-known  absorption  of savings  from the  rest  of
the  world.
There  are  some  arithmet._.s  in  my  paper  fPPR  Working  Paper,
WPS  9],  which  suggests  that  if  we  wanted  to  get back  to the invest-
ment ratios of  the early 1970s, the very peak ratios we  ever
recorded,  and if U.S. savings  were not to move from the savings
achieved  at present  over the  last cycle,  over the  last few years,
then  the  rest  of the  world,  the  rest  of the  OECD  area  would  have to
increase  its gross savings ratio to GDP to levels very rarely
recorded  in the  past. Therefore,  it  wouldn't  be totally  unfeasible
to  get  back  to  an investment  ratio  like  that  of 1973,  but  it  would  be
difficult.
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Physical  Where  does  thls  dlscussion  lead  me on  this  sort  of  physical
constraInts  to  constralnts  to  growth?  Most of them,  I thlnk,  have probably  been
growth?  overplayed.  I. is  typical  of  periods  of  slowdown  and  of recession  to
suggest that  structural  dlfficulties,  rigidities  and shortcomings
have beset  the  world  economy.  That  was sald durlng  the  so-called
Great  Depression  of the '70s  and '80s  of the  last  century. It was
deflnitely  sald  In the  1930s. Everybody  kept  arguing  that  in  no way
could  we ever  get out  of slow  growth.  It Is being  argued  again  in
the  1980s.
I  would  have  thought  that  both  the  experience  of those  few
countries  which  gre,.  rapidly  In the course of the '30s as they
changed  their  policies,  as well as the  experiences  of the '50s  and
'60s  suggest  that  these  fears  are  not  fully  justified.
Nonetheless  there  may  be  some  truth  to  some  of these  fears
and hence there  may be a need for caution  in any stlmulation  of
activity  or in  any system  shock  which  we may want to impart  to the
system. But  I  don't  think  the  case  is  that  important  and  that  strong
as a lot  of contemporary  orthodoxy  would  lead  one to  believe.
If  one  assumes  that  the  supply  potential  Is  there,  at  least
for  a rate above  the  2-1/2  percent  which  we have been experiencing
for  a long  time,  say,  3 co  3.5  percent,  Ideally  4,  how  can  we  get to
it? Now  one  problem  is the  physical  capacity. The  next  problem  is:
What sort of either  policies  or other events  can get us back to
relatively  rapid  growth?
One idea,  of course,  would  be just  a return  to  Xeyneslan-
stimulated  policies. I see  there  a  much  more Important  constraint,
not a physical  one, but in a sense  one of attitudes.  Keynesian
pollcies  now are surrounded  by a very large  degree  of skepticism.
People  don't  believe  in their  efficacy.  Even  when their  efficacy  to
my  mind  is  supported  by  both  British  and  Japanese  experience  in  1986-
88 period,  nonetheless  there is profound  skepticism  about them;
hence,  the  chances  of  regenerating  activity  just  by  returning  to  more
expansionary  policies,  larger  budget  deficits  and so on, are very
limited.
Another possibility  --  and thls now goes back to the
transition  phase  itself  --  is  an  orderly  transition  from  the  present
problems.  If we can get out of the present  mess possibly in a
cooperative  fashion (i.e.,  a gradual  and orderly  unfolding  of the
global  payments  imbalances)  combined  with a much higher  degree  of
optimism,  we could  generate  the  system  shock  which to my mind is
essential  for a return  to  high  growth.
In other  words,  just  as growth  in the  1950s  and 1960s  was
very  rapid,  thanks  partly  (or  largely  to  my  mind)  to  a  regime  change,
a  move  from  basically  laissez-faire  government  policies  to  much  more
interventionist  in  the  macroeconomic  field  by  government  policies,  a
regime  change  could  occur  in  the  late  1980s  where  we  move  from  basic.
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ally,  national  soverelgnty  over governmenc  policy  co a much larger
degree  of  international  cooperation  in  government  policy. This  could
be the  system  shock  of the  1990s  and  could  get  us out  of the  present
problems,  in  an  orderly  fashion.
If the transition  is disorderly,  I.e.,  inflationary,  as
Paul Armington  suggests,  or is achieved  via a much more profound
recession  than  presently  on the  cards,  then  I  would  have  thought  that
the  chances  for  growth  in the  1990s  are that  much  dimmer,  that  much
worse,  capacity  or no capacity,  because  the  policy  background  would
be so  much  less  favorable.
Therefore,  to  my  mind  the  issues  are,  on  the  one  hand,  this
broad  idea  of whether  the  capacity  is  actually  there,  and  growth  can
go  beyond  the  2-1/2  percent  rate;  secondly,  what  is  the  nature  of the
transition  process. Is it liKely  to be favorable,  orderly,  smooth
or, as I fear,  is it instead  going  to generate  inflation  or reces-
sion,  or conceivably  both? And  thirdly,  if that  were the  case,  what
other  system  shocks,  if  one  believes  in  the  system  shock  idea,  would
be necessary  or desirable  to  get  us back  to  a faster  growth  path  at
a  later  stage,  towards  che  end  of the  1990s?
MR.  BANETH:  Perhaps  we can, in fact, take  as not yet
fully resolved  the short-term  cransition  problem, and start the
discussion  on the  nature  of the  short-run  problem  and  how we could
get  out  of it.
I  have  a  great  deal  of  sympathy  with  Boltho's  analysis  and
his  findings,  including  the  conclusion.  It is  that  conclusion  which
generates  profound  pessimism. It is  difficult  to  see  the  leadership
or thb.  policies  or the  social  attitudes,  which In  fact  will  allow  us
to return  to faster  growth.  There  are a couple  of issues  that I
would like  us to discuss  here.  One is the  social  consequences  in
the industrial  countries  if we do not return to faster growth.
Fifteen  years  ago  there  was  a general  expectation  that  if unemploy-
ment reaches,  say, 5 percent in  Europe, there is going to be a
catastrophe.  And to use a French expression,  some people have
referred  to the  Divine  Surprise,  that  you  could  go above  10  percent
and  not  get  revolution.
But  I  personally  am  not  convinced  that  these  things  happen
immediately  and  without  lags,  and  the  fact that  we had  only limited
harmful  political  and  social  consequences  in the  short-run  does  not
necessarily  mean that  this  can  continue.
Obviously,  for us of greatest  interest  is the impact  of
all  this  on  developing  countries.  There  was  a  lot  of talk  of decoup-
ling  growth. Is  that  likely  to  happen? What  is the  interaction  both
ways?  How do the  developing  countries  contribute  to this  process,
negatively  through  debt  crisis  and  other  negative  system  shocks,  or
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perhaps  positively  through  generating  the  demand  whlch  can  provide
the  burst  of acceleration  in  growth  rates?
Complex  of  MR.  OHLIN:  I  would  like  to  organize  my comments  under
Investment  three  headings  to  make  it  simpler  rather  than  to  follow  the  [Boltho]
Technology  and  paper as a wnole.  Those would be, first of all, the complex  of
Structural  investment  and  technology  and  structural  change;  secondly,  the  role
Change  of policies;  and thirdly,  the international  system  and its imbal-
ances.
Let  us start  then  with  growth  and  our  understanding  of it.
There  is, in the  paper,  a devastating  survey  of growth theory  and
attempts  to understand  growth  in the  past.  It makes it perfectly
clear  how little  consensus  there  really  is  on the  interpretation  of
historical  growth,  but  also,  for  that  matter,  on the  post-war  Golden
Age.  The  author  cites  a  great  many  divergent  views.
He  may  have  gone  a bit too  far  in the  assumption  that  all
these  views  are  borne  equal,  and  there  might  be a bit  more consensus
about  what the  important  ideas  are  and  what  th'e  less  important  ideas
are.  Nonetheless,  the basic impression  of great  intellectual
confusion  prevails.
This must  be of particular  importance  for those  of us in
international  organizations  who  are  supposed  to  know  and  are  expected
to  tell  countries  what they  can  do to  get  more  growth. The  fact  is
that  no one knows  very  much about  it,  and thi:  ought to  make for  a
great  deal  of humility.
Let  me  return to  the assertive rather than  to  the
destructive  aspects  of the  paper. If  I understand  Boltho  correctly,
he says  that  in  generally  stable  conditions,  with  an ample  supply  of
labor  and other  requirements  met --  including  the  supply  of entre-
preneurs --  growth should be pretty automatic if investment  is
incited  by expectations.  And as far  as the  irregularities  that  we
have observed  in the past go, they should  be understood  to have
resulted  from disruptions,  some of which  might stem from economic
policy.
This is pretty close to a neo-classical  approach.  The
difficulty  I have with this is over the  approach  to the nature  of
growth  and the  sources  of growth. One should  not, it seems to  me,
dismiss  technology  as assiduously  as Boltho  tries  to do.  He raised
the  question  of technology,  but  he  nonetheless  concludes  that  one  can
afford  to  disregard  it.
I think  he is rightly  ridiculing  the  fatalistic  approach
to  Kondratieff,  but  I think  that  is  flogging  a dead  horse. Nonethe-
less,  when  Schumpeter  named  the  Kondratieff  cycle,  there  was  more to
it than  just  reference  to  Kondratieff.
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What Schumpeter  very imaginatively  incorporated  in his
conception  of  growth  in technology  is  worth retaining. And Boltho
doesn't  really  raise  this  in  his  paper. He cites  Schumpeter  on the
decline  of  capitalism,  not  on the  importance  of  entrepreneurs.
Schumpeter's  idea  of the link  between  the  growth  and the
cycle,  for  instance,  was  meant  to  relate  to  the  consequences  of  major
technological  breakthroughs. He suggested  that one could  make a
distinction  between  fundamental  ones,  which  would  pervade  the  economy
completely,  by  changing  the  sources  of energy  and  so  forth,  and  less
important  ones.  That  seems  to  me to  make  a lot  of sense.
And  above  all, the  conclusion  that  he drew  is one that  I
think  is  surprisingly  neglected,  and that  was that the  introduction
of technological  breakthroughs  in  some  area  or other  was  bound  to  be
followed  by  problems  of  absorption  and  by  a  great  deal  of  competition
between  the  old  and the  new technology  and,  therefore,  a slowdown  in
growth  with  rising  unemployment.
What  interests  me in  this  approach  is the  plausibility  and
realism  that  I find in such an approach  to technology  as distincc
from the idea  of simply  putting  it into  a production  function  and
assuming that it wi.'l  have a  smooth  and even impact on factor
productivity.
So  on  this  score  I  think  Boltho  has  underestimated  the  role
of technology.  While  it  is  difficult  to  measure  the  role  of techno-
logy  as Boltho  argues,  that seems  to me to be  beside  the point.
There  are  lots  of things  in  economics  that  can't  be  measured.
I have been intrigued  by the  iniportance  that  Boltho  has
attached  to  growth  policies  or  macroeconomic  policies  in  general  in
determining  growth.  I think  I might  buy  in the  short-run  the  idea
that  policies  can do a lot  to slow  down  growth  and  hold investment
back.
But  that seems to me  to ignore another common sense
observation  of a historical  nature,  which  Boltho  does comment  on,
namely  the  role  of institutions,  the  role  of microeconomic  aspects,
which  is  a  very  big  black  box. To that  Boltho  adds  the  legal  system,
government  regulation,  educational  policy, technology  policy, and
foreign investment  policy.  I  think these deserve considerable
attention  here,  not  just  in  developed  countries  but  quite  parcicular-
ly in  developing  countries.
In the  paper  by Reynolds  [JEL,  June 1987] the  conclusion
was  that  over  150  years  the  only  conclusion  one  could  draw  of growth
that  what really  mattered  most of all was political  stability  and
good  public  administration.  This is  of course  not  much if  one  wants
to say  something  interesting  about  growth. But it is a minimalist
approach.
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I think  ore  could  probably  say  more  than  that. It is  often
said that  we don's  have  controlled  experiments  and  so forth,  but  we
have a fantastic  array on which to base comparative  studies,  and
above  all  we  d.,  have  these  remarkable  instances  of successful  growth
and government promotion of growth --  Germany  in the 19th  century,
Japan  in this  century,  the  new  NICs  and  so  forth.
The  Germans  and the  Japanese  in the  times  of their  glory
didn't  have  any  macroeconomists  around  at  all,  and  their  approach  was
totally  different. They  went  out to  look  at other  countries  in the
world  and  see  what  they  were  doing  and  to  adapt  their  institutions  to
their  own  conditions.  Ana they  had  programs.  common  sense  programs
for  modernization  of  their countries.  These were essentially
political  institutions.
Simon  Kuznets,  for  all  his  work  on growth,  was  always  very
careful  to insist  that  he didn't  understand  it at all.  And  he was
very  close  to this  minimalist  view. He did think  that  it  was impor-
tant to emphasize  the convergence,  the confluence  of changes in
different  parts of society,  economic,  political  and institutional
and  so  forth,  and  our  mutual  support  to  influence  them. I chink  some
of this  Kuznetsian  perspective  is  helpful  also when  we look to the
future.
Present  Policy  Now  I  come  to  the  problem  of external  payments  imbalances.
Challenges:  Prof.  Boltho  hints  towards  the  end  of  his  paper  that  the  presumption
The Massive  for what he is saying  is that  we get over these Imbalances, that we
Imbalances..,  unwind  these  imbalan-ces,  and that  nothing  can  really  happen  before
we have  done that.
e  Well, I  am beginning to react against this sort of
'zonventional  wisdom.  I don't  think that the issue  is how we are
going to unwind  the imbalances. I think  the question  is how they
are  going  to  be  reduced  to  a level  where  they  are  sustainable,  where
the  financing  of deficits  and  flows,  which  by historical  standards
are not  all that  great  and  which  by any  approach  to  growth  are  not
very difficult  to  understand,  will  again  be  possible.
And this  leads  me to say  something  about  the  premise  that
we are in  a situation  with  imbalances  which  are  widely  agreed  to be
unsustainable.  Precisely  why is  not always  made clear.
It  seems  to  me there  are  two  fundamental  dimensions  to  this
question  of sustainability. One relates to the debtor  side.  If
interest  rates  are  much  higher  than  the  rate  of  growth  of repayment
capacity  and  this  lasts  for  a  very  long  time,  then  obviously  arithme-
tically  you  are  in  a hopeless  situation.  At che  same  time,  there  is
a case  for bridging  finance  when this is  not  going  to be so in the
lending  phase.
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In the  1960s,  I remember  that  In the  OECD and  here  at the
World  Bank  we talked  now  and  then  about  the  point  of  no return  beyond
whlch we couldn't  go in financing  deficits  If the situation  was
unpropitious. It might be wise to take a look at that kind of
problem  again.
But the  other  dimension  to sustainabillty  relates  to the
stability  of the international  system  and the degree  of risk that
creditors  are  willing  to  assume,  and  the  assessments  they  make  of the
future. Ts  it  likely  that  the  repayment  capacity  is  going  to  remain
as low  as it  Is  and  so  forth. This  Is  where  stability  in  general  and
institutional  arrangements  are fundamental  to the molding  of the
expectations  that  you,  I think,  quite  correctly  found  so  essential  to
investment.
I  would  reverse  the  order,  and  say that  we are  not likely
to unwind  the imbalances  and thereby  return  to stability. We are
going  to  have  to  find  stability  In  order  to  live  with the  imbalances,
not  necessarily  at the  present  magnitude,  but it is  unreasonable  to
assume that  we are going to be able to get rid of them terribly
quickly.
MR.  BANETH:  Can  one  live  with  the  imbalances,  unwinding
or  not,  and  to  what  extent? Which  precedes  what?  Are  there  ways  of
unwinding  them  which  promote  stability,  and  what are those  ways?
More  on current  MR.  LIPSCHITZ:  I  found  Professor  Boltho's  presentation
account  quite  fase-inating.  The  strongest  evidence  for  your  [Bolthol  being  an
imbalances  unreconstructed  Keynesian  was,  perhaps,  the  absence  of  any
intertemporal  considerations,  intertemporal  constraints  of  any  sort,
in the  discussion.  This is  unusual  on this  side  of the  Atlantic.
The theme  of anything  I would  say about  both the  current
imbalances  and about  longer-term  questions  of  growth  would be che
need to take  explicit  account  of intertemporal  constraints. It is
quite  difficult  to  disentangle  what  is  going  on  within  the  industrial
world: two  sorts  of  things  are  happening  in  concert. One  is  clearly
a  set of  imbalances  that were  generated by  unwise government
policies,  perhaps to a large extent  in the United States,  which
created  international  imbalances  that  are  unsustainable.  (Incident-
ally, because  of the longer-term  consequences,  the intertemporal
constraints,  I  wouldn't  characterize  the  U.S.  policies  of  late  as a
Keynesian  success  story.) We  have  got that  sort  of imbalance. The
other  sort  of  imbalance  is  something  thac  we characterize  as incerna-
tional  imbalance,  but  at least  in a large  part, to  my mind, it  is
intertemporal  balance. Let  me be  more specific.
To  the extent that in Japan, and to a  lesser extent
Germany,  one  can  characterize  high  national  savings  ratios  as befing
in  part an  anticipation  of demographic  trends,  one can't  possibly
WPIPROC/SF:Jsq12
characterize  them  as imbalances.  If you save  a lot  now because  of
lmpendlng  retlrement,  that  is,  intertemporally,  an  optimal  decision;
It Is  not  an imbalance  In  any  sense. Once  you  have  saved  a lot,  the
question  is  what  to  do  with  your  savings. Now  it  would  be  wonderful
If  you  found  Investment  opportunities  at home,  but if it turns  out
that  there  are  better  investment  opportunities  In  Korea  or  Taiwan  or
somewhere  else 'n  the  world,  It is In  no sense  an imbalance  to puc
your savings  into those  countries  and to run large  current  account
surpluses.  I  would  characterize  that  positively  as  an equilibrating
economic  phenomenon.
So I  would  say that  these  are  at least  parts  of the  large
surpluses  we see in the  surplus  countries  that  aren't  in  any sense
imbalances.  They are an equilibrating  process. Of course,  disen-
tangling  that  from  the  effects  of the  Reagan  fiscal  shock  is  awfully
difficult.  But  what  I  would  plead  here is that  we do try  and  disen-
tangle  them,  and  we distinguish  real imbalances  from  optimal  inter-
temporal  decisions.
I  was  surprised  at  the  characterization  of  growth  as being
driven  chiefly  by Investment. I thought  that  long-term  growth  was
explained,  to a significant  extent,  by total factor  productivity
(which  is  a  name for  what  we cannot  explain  by the  contributions  of
capital  and  labor). And  when  you  look  at that  in  different  periods,
I would  have thought  we could  attribute  it to technology,  to entre-
preneurship  or the growth of entrepreneurship,  and to what the
psychologists  call hygiene  factors,  that is, the cleaning  out of
restrictive  regulatory  practices.
If it  is correct  that total  factor  productivity  explains
a large  part  of  growth,  I think  you  have  attributed  too  much impor-
tance  to investment  and demand  forces. But,  more  generally,  if  one
thinks that  growth will proceed  over the longer-run  by means of
government-generated  demand  shocks,  one  has co ask:  Where  do you
start  from  and  where  do  you  end  up?
Policy  If you start  from  very low budget  deficits  and very low
Reforms...  government-debt-to-GNP  ratios,  you can rely  on fiscal  stimulus  for
quite  a  while. But if  you  start  from  anywhere  like  where  we  are  now,
how  do you  do it? We  have situations  in  countries  that  we are  mark-
ing as possible  engines  for growth, like Germany  or like much of
Europe,  where  government  debt/GNP  ratios  are awfully  high and are
projected  to increase  further.
We  have a  situation where monetary stimulus is not
effective  because  yield  curves  are  already  very  steep: while  govern-
ments  can  push  down  short-term  interest  rates,  the  long  rates  don't
go down  because  of skepticism  in the  markets  of the  long-run  impact
of expansionary  monetary  policies. Moreover,  it is the  longer-term
rates  that  influence  the  interest-sensitive  componencs  of demand.
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Jo  if  you  are  starting  from  where  we are  now,  I  don't  know
how  you can  assign  so large  a role to the  government.  If  you are
scarting  from  some  position  of  a better  relationship,  becter  sorr  of
scock  relationship  between  government  finances  and  the  economy,  chen
che  critical  question  is:  How do we get from here co there?  But
even  if  one  starts  there,  can  one  characterize  a steady  state,  which
is  driven  entirely  by  government  intervention?  When  we know  that  if
government  deficits  grow larger,  eventually  we  have  a  problem  of the
debt  being  so large  that  it exhausts  the  discrecionary  capacity  for
the  government  to  operate  fiscal  policy.
Let  me make one  plug,  though,  for the  sort  of shock  that
I think  can  generate  growth  over  the  medium  term,  and  it  is  something
that  Boltho  downplays,  and that  is the  "hygiene  factors"  shock,  the
getting  rid of regulatory  rigidities. I know that  has  been  a term
that  has been thrown  around  rather  loosely  in the last  few years.
When  we don't  know  what  to  do  with  macro  policies,  it  is  very  popular
to say  that  there  must  be something  regulatory  or structural  we can
change.
Japan  and  But  I think  there  is  more to  it than  that. In  Japan,  for
Germary  example,  if  one  looks  at the  agricultural  sector  and  the  interaction
between  land  prices  and  construction  activity,  there  is an enormous
capacity  for  deregulation  which  would  generace  construction,  boost
home  ownership  and lift  the  standard  of Japanese  housing.
When one looks  at Germany,  what one sees is evidence  of
very  high  preference  for leisure  rather  than  consumption. Germany
seems  incapable  of generating  sustained  growth  on private  domestic
impulses. But  there  is  also  tremendous  regulation  of the  non-traded
goods'  sector. Germans  can't  buy  because  shops  are closed  half the
time.  They  can't  have sales  in shops;  they  can't have aggressive
marketing in the retail sector because of outmoded restrictive
regulations.  The  domestic  land  transportation  sector  Is completely
tied up by regulation. An elimination  of these impediments  would
simply  have  to  generate  some  capacity  for  additional  investment,  some
dynamism.
This  is  the  sort  of  government-generated  stimulus  which  do
not lead to steady  state  problems  over:  the longer  term and which
could,  I think,  raise  cotal  factor  product:ivity  and  growch  potential.
Role  of LDCs  MR.  RUSSO  I will continue  on this same vein,  and I
think the paper of Andrea [Boltho]  dismisses  a  bit lightly the
question  of the LDCs' role in deciding  what is che appropriate
pattern  of present  current  account  deficits  and surpluses  and whac
is  a desirable  surplus.
Japan and Germany  have faced similar  situations.  High
government  debt creates constraints  in some European countries.
These  countries  are  unwilling  or unable  to increase  their  debt  and.
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therefore,  they  have to reduce  their  primary  deficits  and therefore
the  counterpart  of that  is  perhaps  in the  external  current  account.
There  is  also  an intertemporal  issue  here.
With these  considerations  in  mind,  a desirable  pattern  of
current  accounts  may well Imply  surpluses  of Japan  and Germany  and
smaller  deficits  of the United  States  but larger  deficits  of the
LDCs. The  fact that  70  percent  of trade  takes  place  within  the  OECD
I  don't  think  is  sufficient  consideration  for  setting  the  LDCs  aside.
In  addition,  issues  concerning  the  exchange  rate  regime  and
policy  coordination  are also very Important. What we see now is
internatlonal  mistrust  rather  than  coordination.  Countries  are  not
prepared  to change  their  policies  because  they  don't  trust  what the
policies  of :he  other  are  going  to  be  and their  effect. As a result
we  make  agreements  and  declarations,  which  naturally  are  broken  very
quickly  or are  modified  very  quickly.
But unless  we  get to  a judgment  about  what Mr. Lipschitz
has underlined,  i.e.,  what Is the  appropriate  position  both within
the  OECD  and  of the  OECD  vis-a-vis  the  LDCs,  I  find  it  very  difficult
that  agreements  can  be sustained. And unfortunately,  the  political
cycle  is such  that  makes  this  agreement  very  difficult.
MR.  PERY_:  A number  of interesting  things  have been
said,  and  I  want  to  commenc  on  a couple  of them. I  would  stress  that
the  paper  we are  discussing  is  worth  everybody's  reading.
More on the  The  idea  of  what  has  to  come  first  is  one  that  does  concern
Imbalances...  this  group,  whether  all of these  so-called  imbalances  have to be
settled  before  you can deal  with growth.  And I do think that is
backwards.  The  imbalances  are  a  product  of  stagnating  economies  and
that,  if  you  ask  if there  is  any  way  out,  you  really  need to  get  out
of stagnation  in  order  to  deal  with  some  of these  imbalances.
It is also true that  what constitutes  an imbalance  is a
little  ambiguous,  and  we tell  the  story  whichever  way it fits best.
If some  countries  really  need to  save  a lot,  that  is not an imbal-
ance.  If they  want to  consume  in the  next century,  that is  not an
imbalance.
But we know that  that  isn't  really  what is going  on.  We
know that the  U.S.  didn't  deliberately  set  out to  have the  current
account  position  it now  has.  It stumbled  and fell into it out of
ignorance  not  design. I  don't  think  there  is  anybody  who  would  make
any  other  case  for the  position  of the  U.S.  current  account.
But, more importantly,  some of the  places  where savings
ought to  go, places  which in a world  of capital  mobility  we would
regard  as having  the  highest  potential  for using  that  capital,  are
unable  to  borrow.
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It would  be higialy  productlve  in an economist's  sense  to
have  a  lot  more  investment  pouring  into  Latin  America,  and that  can't
be done  for  the  obvious  reasons  under  currene  arrangements.
So I  don't think  we can Just sit back and say what we
observe  is what everyone  intended  or what is best.  We do have co
thlnk  of these  things  as  problems  that  have  arisen  and  ask  what  mighc
help  ouc.  You  need to  have  a lot  of expansion  In  order  to  alle-'iace
some  of these  financial  problems  that  exist.
And the  idea  tnat  you  can talk  about  growth  once  you  have
dealt  with  financial  pro')lems  really  is  backwards.  It  is  an attitude
and  a  point  of view  thac  can  only  worsen  some  of the  issues  that  we
are talking  about.
Once  again  we know  what  will  scimulate  economies  and  what
will  slow  them  down. There  are  some  barriers.  I think  they  are  self-
inflicted  barriers,  that  are  probably  relatively  important  in  parts
of Europe. I think  of them  mainly  as barriers  in the  labor  market
and Institutional  arrangements  that  make expansion  a little  more
difficult. I think  even those  are  endogenous  and  would  mele in the
face of stronger  expansion. So I am really  siding  wich Boltho's
conclusions.
Not only am I siding with him, but arguments to the
contrary  seem  to  be based  on little  or no evidence. At the  risk  of
sounding  a bit  too  simplistic,  I think  che  direction  in  which  every-
thing  has to go is clear.  The policical  will is quite anocher
matter, and I agree that Europe is in the midst of a political
situation  that  makes nobody  anxious  to do the right thing.  That
doesn't  mean that  we shouldn't  recognize  it.
MR.  O'BRIEN:  Addressing  directly  the  Boltho  paper,  I
think  there  are two  areas  I would  like  to talk  abouc.  One is  again
a  general  discussion  of imbalances,  consequences  of unwinding  or  not,
and che  role  of cooperacive  behavior  in that,  and then  also  I would
like to make some comment  on where inflation  fits into che whole
thing,  including  its  relationship  with the  imbalances.
It  is  clear  that  there  are  four  areas  where  it  is  important
how  you unwind  the  imbalances.  One is  where  you are  going co  starc
from,  in  terms  of  capacity  utilization  and  unemployment,  when the  new
growth  starts,  if  it  ever  does. Secondly  is  what  is  actually  done  to
the  attitude  to  risk-taking  and  investment  during  a prolonged  period
of uncertainty.  The  third  is  the  state  of the  world  trading  system,
given  the  pressures  for  protection  that  the  imbalances  generate.
But  fourch  is the  functioning  of financial  markecs  which
are  spending  a long time  worrying  about  short-term  flows  consequent
or not knowing  what is happening  with the imbalances,  and at the
beginning  of  an  upturn  it  would  be  nice if  financial  markets  had  some
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tralning  in thinking  about the long-term  rather than simply the
short-term.
Cooperative  As  to whether there is  a  feasible route after  the
policy  Imbalances,  I think  it Is  worthwhlle  recalling  where  they  came  from,
solutions...  and that this relates  to tne  possibility  of having  a cooperative
solution,  I think.
The  imbalances  come from lrbalanced  policies and  the
imbalanced  policies  come  from  differing  views  in  dlfferent  countries,
partly  about  what  are the  underlying  problems  and  partly  about  what
the  appropriate  methods  for dealing  with chem  are, so that  one has
had  over the  last  six,  seven,  eig;t  years,  a variety  of  policles.
Taking  the example  of what has happened  from the end of
1986  onwards  in terms  of the  apparent  development  of cooperation,  it
strikes  me that  this  is  actually  being  the  development  of  occasional-
ly sophisticated  ways of hiding the fact that everybody  actually
disagrees  on  what  they  are  meant  to  do,  whlle  producing  statements  to
the  effect  that  they  agree.
Maybe a  quicker way and a better way to resolve the
imbalances  would  be to  admit  that  cooperative  solutions  aren't  going
to work, because  we don't  actually  agree on what the cooperative
solution  is, and, further,  [policy-makers  may eventually]  let the
exchange rate pattern take the consequences [because] of  the
underlying  savings-investment  imbalances.
And maybe,  rather  than  a cooperative  solution,  [a major
change]  might  then  provide  the  system  shock that  Boltho  is talking
about,  rather  than trying  to keep the  current  system  going  as long
as  possible  on  a cooperative  basis.
I would also like to mention that I think the role of
inflation  and  the  possible  danger  of inflation  in  an eventual  secular
upcurn  may  be understressed  in  Boitho's  paper.
But  will  growth  go beyond  2-1/2  percent  towards  the  mid-
1990s? If  not,  we  will  have  unemployment  remaining  high  and  capaci-
ty utilization  not  increasing  beyond the current levels.  And
although  we  have  this  low  growth  picture  in  the  medium-term  outlook,
the  inflation  picture  that  is  thought,  by  country  experts  within  the
OECD to  be  consistent  with this  unemployment  outlook,  is  one  in  which
inflation  doesn't  decelerate  any  further.
Inflation  But  why, despite  such a high level  of unemployment,  is
threat..,.  inflation  not  going  down  at a  faster  rate? Two  explanations  are  pos-
sible  among the many.  One is the  hysteresis  argument, that che
equilibrium  (in  the  inflation  sense)  rate  of  unemployment  follows  the
actual  rate  of unemployment  around.
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Another  argument  which  was suggested  to ra.ionalize  what
we think  has been happening  and is going to happen in the lnfla-
tion/unemployment  relationship,  is that  somehow  there  is  actually  a
floor,  at the  moment,  to what wage inflation  can be.  Custom  and
practice  say that  wages  will not grow by less than  such and such,
depending  on the  country,  just  because  people  have  got used  to  high
wage rate growth,  from a period  of prolonged  high inflacion;  they
think  in  terms  of reducing  wages  to  a  particular  level.
Those two rationallzations  are attempts  at interpreting
recent  hlstory  and our forecasts. But in terms  of the  revival  of
growth,  they  clearly  have different  implications,  and particularly
if  hysteresis  is  the  correct  explanation  or  at least  has  more  of the
explanation  ccntained  in  it,  then  any  kind  of increase  In  the  rate  of
growth which is sufficient to reduce actual unemployment  will
increase  inflation,  and  to  return  to  a sustained  level  of relatively
low  unemployment  will result  in  a permanently  higher  rate  of infla-
tion.  Even if  hysteresis  works  both  ways, then the  inflation  rate
ought  to  stabilize  eventually,  but  it  will be  permanently  higher.
On the  other  hand, if the  floor  argument  is the  correct
way to interpret  what is going on, that is perhaps a bit more
optimlstic. Inflation  needn't  rise  until  the  floor  ceases  to be a
binding  constraint.
But although  in that case one might characterize  it as
being  more optimistic  than the  hysteresis  argument,  I think  it is
still  a  pessimistic  view  since  it is saying  that  nothirng  has  really
changed  however  you  characterize  the  inflation  and  growth  trade-off.
Nothing  has really  changed  over the last  period  of recession  from
what  we had  before. None  of the  problems  have been  solved.
And  I  think  this  would  bring  us  back  to  where  the
Imbalances  came  from.  I  described  the  imbalances  as coming  from  a
confusion  of  policy  responses.  These responses  were to economic
stagnation.  Where  did  the  stagnation  come  from?  Boltho  discusses
whether  it was real wages,  demand,  a few other things,  but really
focussing  on the  former  two  kinds  of  alternatives.  He suggests  that
while  too  high  real  wages  might  have  something  to  do  with  the  problem
in the  mid to late  1970s  that  most  of it was due to relatively  low
aggregate  demand  growth.
Now it is  my recollection  that  one of the  more important
reasons  for  that  low  aggregate  demand  growth  was  actually  a response
to a perceived  wage problem,  nominal  wage growth  perhaps,  or the
level of real wages.  In other words, one could argue that the
imbalances  in part  come  from a structural  inflation  problem  in the
OECD  economies.
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PROF.  BRADFORD:  To summarize  Professor  Boltho's  paper
in  a  concise  way  so  as to  be  able  to  make  some  remarks,  the  question.
I  guess,  ls:  What  does thls  longer-run  historical  perspective  give
us?  And  I think  It  gives  us some  useful  Insights.
I thlnk  the  problem  Is  when  he gets  down to  what could  be
done that  It is  not clear  to  me that  the  longer-term  perspective  is
so  helpful. Basically  what  you  examined,  it  seems  to  me,  is  a set  of
Issues  that  had to do with:  one, whether  or not there  were any
physical  capacity  constraints  to  longer-term  faster  growth,  and  you
came up with the conclusion that, no,  there were no physical
constraints.
Smooth  tran-  The longer-term  perspective  leads  to,  I think,  a hopeful
sition  from  Inquiry  into  whether  or  not  it Is  possible  to  get  what  you  called  an
Imbalances  t'  ordinary  or smooth  transition  from  the  current  set  of Imbalances  to
long-term  a longer-run  growth  path  and to  explore  positive  system  shocks  as a
growth?  mechanism  for  getting  there  and  to  meeting  the  kind  of expectational
Investment-growth  linkage  that  you  find there.
I  have  some  difficulties  with  that,  because  it  seems  to  me
that the  nature  of the  world economy  since 1973  at least  is quite
the  contrary  from  what It had  been  prior to  1973.  I think  what  we
see is not a smooth  path but rather,  a  sequence  of disequilibria.
In fact  what you  have is  a klnd  of Jolt to the  system  which  sets  up
some disequillbrium  forces,  which  have led to over-correction  in a
next phase,  and on and on.  So that rather  than there  being some
conver-gence  back  to  a  smoother  path,  what  you  really  have  is  eratic
trends  and  more cycles.
During  this  period,  despite  all the  academic  fussings  and
debates  about macroeconomics,  there  has beer-,  as we all know, an
extraordinary  consensus,  ln  analytical  economics  and  internationally,
about  the  one  fundamental  cause  of  world  Imba.aices,  namely  the  U.S.
fiscal  deficit. And  what  we see there  is,  I  1-hink,  the  place  where
the crucial capacity  question  comes to bea-, and  that physical
constraints  are  not the  dilemma. The  real  capacity  constraint  is  a
political  one.
If  you believe  that  the  world  economy  since  1973  has some
intrinsic  and  policy-induced  sequences  of disequilibria,  and  if you
think  that  where  we are  short  on capacity  In the  world  economy  today
Is  on the  political  side,  then  the  more  logical  conclusion  to  draw  is
that  perhaps  the  way to change  to  a regime  toward  greater  interna-
tional  coordination  Is  not  by  some  sort  of  positive  policy  whiplash,
which doesn't  seem to be in the offlng,  but rather  by a negative
system shock,  namely a further  downturn  of sufficiently  dramacic
dimensions  to  induce  a  political  change.
Otherwise,  I think,  the  scenario  that  you  paint,  where  you
have  actually  assumed  away  the  imbalances,  one  of long-term  sluggish
stagnation  or stagflation,  is  perhaps  the  more  likely  scenario. But
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I don't see us vaultlng  to higher  growth  from a positive  regime
change  but  rather  from  a  negative  downturn,  and that  inducing  regime
transformation.
MR. RAO.  I am having  some trouble  understanding  what
exactly  the  system  shock  thesis  Is. I  might  put  forvard  two  alterna-
tive  hypotheses  or  descriptlons  of it,  and  I  wonder  which  one  we are
really  talking  about.
Systems  If one  accepts  the  statement  that  in the  1950s  and 1960s
shocks.........  growth  was  somehow  stimulated  by  some  system  shock -- and  I see  the
definition  of the  system  shock  here  as being  more skillful  macroeco-
nomic  management  and  Bretton  Woods  and  all  of that --  and  now  we see
In  recent  years  some  sort  of  stagnatlon  settIng  in. Are  we  observing
the natural  running  down of the effect  of any shock  so that the
present  stagnation  is  simply  the  netural  plateauing  after  the  initial
response  to  the  stimulus  provided  by  a shock? Alternatively,  are  we
seeing  the  unwinding  of  the  improvements  that  brought  about  the  1950s
and the  1960s  growth?
In this  second  interpretation,  we are seeing  not a shock
and  a  plateauing,  but  rather  an improved  -egime  that  had  good  results
backsliding  to  a less  appropriate  or salubrious  regime  for  interna-
tional growth, and if that Is the case --  then I think Professor
Bradford's  thesis  is that  a sort  of negative  shock  might  be  what  we
are looking  for.  In other  words,  you sink so low,  you hit rock
bottom  and then  everyone  is  jolted  in realizing  how bad things  can
get and then say, well,  you have got to do something  about this,
which  is  the  sort  of  political  shock  that  I think  Professor  Bradford
was referring  to.
So I would  like to know  which  of these  hypotheses  one is
talking  about. My next  question  is:  looking  at [the  assumption  in
Professor  Boltho's  paper),  the  data  of  GDP  weights  for  1965,  1985  and
2000,  one sees  developing  country  weights  going  from 16 percent  in
1965  to  22  percent  in  1985,  but  being  projected  to  grow to  33  percent
in  2000.
Now that, If it happens, would itself be a shock --  notr
just  a shock  in  realizing  that  this  is  what  is  happening,  but  also  a
shock to the international  system because surely, if developing
countries  go from  22 to 33 percent  of world  GDP (excluding  Eastern
Europe  and  USSR),  they  must  be doing  something  to the  international
system  which  would  constitute  somewhat  of  a shock  to the  system.
PROF.  BOLTHO: I can answer these questions  and I can
answer  some  points  that  have been raised  in the  discussion,  part-
icularly  by Goran  Ohlin  and  Leslie  Lipschitz.
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On what Is the  system  shock,  I  haven't  defined  It  myself.
I  am  not  quite  sure  there  is  a  scale  to  elther  of the  two  lnterpreta-
tlons  you have put forward,  though  I suppose  a mixture  of the two
mlght  do.
Definftion  of  But  speclflcally  taking  the  posltlve  shock  of the 1950s,
system  shock...  the  international  monetary  system  and  domestic  policies,  why  did  they
collapse?  The slmpllstic  explanation  ls:  there were negative
shocks,  the  two  oil  shocks  in quick  successior,  plus the  shock  of the
mld-1980s,  the  big  external  payment  Imbalances  developing. Surely
that  can  counterbalance  any  posltive  policies.
But  I  thlnk  there  Is  more  to  it  than  that  in  the  sense  that
the  success  of the  1950s  and  1960s  was  carrying  the  seeds  of its  own
destruction  in two  ways:  a domestlc  way, through  acceleration  of
inflatlon  and  full  employment  together  with  conflicting  claims,  too
ambitlous  policies,  too  much fine-tuning,  hence  an acceleration  of
Inflation,  which even if we hadn't  had the  oll shock  would almost
certainly  have led  us into  a much more restrlctive  stance  in late
1970s  or early  1980s.
The second  set  of problems  which  the system  was creating
were  international  and  financial  In  nature  and  led  to  the  breaking  up
of Bretton Woods.  This idea of the dollar remaining  a reserve
currency  forever,  nobody  worrying  about  it,  even  though  everybody  was
accumulating  It  was  too  good to last. Hence,  both  mainstays  of the
system  were  doomed  from  the  start. Expansionary  policies  were  going
to  have to  give  way to  restrictive  policles  because  of  accelerating
inflatlon.  An  international  monetary  system,  which  was  thought  to  be
very  stable,  had  a strong  potential  for  falling  apart. In fact,  it
fell  apart  even  before  the  oil  shock  because  of the  so-called  Triffin
Inconsistency  wlthin  It.  To that  were  then  added  the  effects  of the
two  oil  shocks  and  everything  else.
The  figures  that  Mr.  Rao was referring  to (i.e.,  a sharp
Increase  In  the  share  of developing  countries  in the  world  output  by
the  year  2000)  are  purely  illustrative.  In  no  way  was that  meant  to
be a projection  of likely  growth  rates. All I was trying  to  do was
to show that,  even under extremely  favorable  assumptions  for the
LDCs, to  my mind it  was unlikely  that  the  LDCs  would take  over the
role of major locomotive  in the world economy.  I was trying  to
defend  my emphasis,  the  focus  of my paper,  which  is entirely  on the
OECD  countries.
I admit  that  actually  If the  LDCs did  grow as rapidly  as
that, that could create some adjustment  problems,  possibly some
favorable  side  effects  for  the  world  economy  at  large. Now  if  I  may,
just on the Imbalances  more generally,  start off with one of the
points  Leslie  Lipschitz  made,  which  I  don't  treat  in  the  paper,  thac
is the  Idea  of an Intertemporal  balance.
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Intertemporal  I would  like  to  comment  on four  points  that  have  actually
imbalances..,  been  raised  In  connectlon  with  the  Issue  of lntertemporal  Imbalances.
On the  one hand, it is argued that the  Germans  and the  Japanese,
because  of their  respective  characteristics,  save a lot.  It just
happens that twenty  years ago the Germans  and the Japanese  were
saving  as  much,  and  possibly  more,  wlthout  probably  really  thinklng
about  these  demographic  problems  at the  beginning  of the  next  century
or by the  year  2020.
Thus the foresight Implicit In thls attitude I  flnd
somewhat  far-fetched.  But  quite  apart  from  that,  are  these  positions
really  balanced  ones? Leslie  Lipschltz  suggests  that  If  the  Japanese
want to  Invest  in  Korea  and  Taiwan,  well that  Is  flne. But  Korea  and
Taiwan  save a lot themselves,  and In fact, they have got current
account  surpluses. They  happen  to  be putting  It all In the  United
States. K.owever,  the  US as a debtor  country  may  not  want It.
There  is  also  a  problem  on the  creditor's  side  because  the
Germans and  the Japanese don't  like  the  real  exchange rate
implications  of their  huge surpluses. Moreover,  there  Is a problem
of  the allocation of  these savings.  Even If  there was  this
intertemporal  balance  which one might  want to maintain, then the
money  shouldn't  be  going  to the  United  States;  It should  be  going  to
the  LDCs,  but  of  course  It  won't. And  crowning  It  a711,  there  is  this
enormous  exchange  market  uncertainty,  which tends to be driven  by
day-  to-day  considerations.
Even if,  in an Ideal  world,  Japanese  savings  ought to be
exported  to  Latin  America,  we are  not  in that  Ideal  world;  we are In
the  presence  of major imbalances,  whatever  intertemporal  shifting
might  lead  one to expect.
Is  it,  therefore,  inevitable  that  the  next  few  years,  1989,
1990  will see  a recession? And  if we see a recession,  will It be
coupled  with inflation,  or  will  we at least  be able to  avoid  one  or
the  other  of these  two  possibilities?
MR. LARSEN:  I was very stimulated  by Professor  Boltho's
conclusion  that  there  seemed  to  be  a  consensus  that  the  issue  of the
imbalances  and their resolution  are ab"'olutely  essential  for the
long-term  outlook.  But  if you would allow me  to be a  little
provocative,  I think  I  would  probably  dissent  to  a  degree,  from that
vlew.
Resolution  of  It is, of course,  quite  possible  that the resolution  of
the  imbalances  the  Imbalances  ultimately  might  result  in  slowdown  in  growth.  I  don't
and  the  long-  think  it  is  necessarily  inevitable  that  it  will. This  is,  of  course,
term  growth...  very  difficult  to  judge,  but  I think  a much  more important  question
is:  Will such  a cyclical  event,  which I would  consider  it to be,
necessarily  affect  the  long-term  growth  path  of the  world  economy,  of
the  industrial  countries  or the  developing  countries?
WP/PROCISF:Jaq22
And  is  the point where I am  beglnning to have some
dlfficultles  with the emphasls  on the imbalances. That is, if we
look  at-  the  very  long-term  growth  trend,  the  possible  growth  path  for
the world economy,  I really  doubt that these imbalances  and the
resolution  of them  are  all  that  Important.
It is,  of course,  possible  chat the imbalances  or their
resolution  might lead to some  policy  mistakes,  particularly  in the
area of protectionism. If that  were the  case,  I would  definitely
share the concern that this might reduce the potential  rate of
growth.
But  otherwise,  in  the  absence  of  such  policy  mistakes  that
could  seriously  interfere  with the  functioning  of the  markets  across
the world economy,  I think  at least it is useful to examine  the
hypothesis  that  the  resolution  of the  imbalances  might  have only  a
short-term  impact  on growth.  If you are looking  at the average
growth  rate for the  next three,  four,  five years,  this is  a very
important  factor  to keep in mind,  and it is important  in its own
right  because  it  could  seriously  damage,  for  example,  the  management
of the  debt  situation  if  growth  in the  industrial  countries  were to
decline  significantly  for a couple  of years.  Going beyond  that,
however,  I really  doubt  that  it is  all  that  important.
Now  what then  determines  growth  over the  medium-term? We
honestly  do not  know  very  much  about  it. And I think  we have to be
extremely  careful  in  entertaining  either  too  optimistic  or too  gloomy
expectations.
Ne:'ertheless,  I  cannot help feeling that I  am  very
impressed  by the  empirical  fact,  as it  is,  which  was also  noted  and
stressed  by Andrea  Boltho  in his introductory  remarks,  that there
seems  to be a secular  growth  trend  which  is not all that  different
from  the  growth  rates  we have  been  experiencing  in the  1980s  [in  the
industrial  countries].
Now  what  exactly  that  means  I  would  not  be  able  to  explain.
But  I cannot  help  but  being  very  impressed  by that  observation.  The
question  then  arises,  of  course,  why  did  we do  so much  better  during
the  Golden  Age,  from the  end  of the  World  War  II till  about  1973?
I think  the  answer  to  our  expectations  for  c.te  medium-term
or for the long-term  future  obviously  must depend,  to a very large
extend,  on the conclusion  that one arrives  at in examining the
possible  reasons  for  why  we did  so  much better  over those  twenty  to
twenty-five  years.
The  catch-up  Boltho  has looked  at a number  of possible  explanations.
hypothesis  I think  personally  I would  pzobably  agree  with most of the  factors
that  have  been  mentioned,  although  I  would  perhaps  attribute  a larger
weight  to the  question  of the  catch-up  hypothesis,  the  process
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whereby  Japan and Europe  gradually  caught up with best practice
technology,  as  it  had  evolved  in  the  Vnted States  over  the  preceding
thirty,  forty years, together  perhaps  with the stimulus  and the
posltive  shock, in a sense,  due to the combination  of post-war
reconstruction  and the liberalization  of international  trade,  the
reduction  of trade  barriers.
It  Is, of course, quite possible that the Keynesian
consensus,  as Boltho  describes  It,  dld  also  contribute. There  were
very  high  growth  expectations.  Governments  actively  sought  co  smooth
out the  cycle  and to  stimulate  growth. But in  examining  and coming
out  with  a  hypothesis  of the  possible  contribution  of this  Keynesian
consensus,  I would  also  take  into  account  some  of the  problems  that
followed  after  the  war.  Expanslonary  flscal  policies  perhaps  were
pursued  a bit  too  long  wlth  the  result  'hat  wage expectations  became
unrealistic  relative  to underlying  productivity  growth,  with the
result  that  wage  earners,  unions  in  many  countries  essentially  forgot
that  they  also  had  a  kind  of responsibility  for  what  happened  to  real
wages  and  thereby  demand  for labor.
To  adjust  these  expectacions  again  was  obviously  associated
with enormous  costs.  So, in discussing  and trying  to measure the
impact  of the Keynesian  consensus,  there  was probably  a  positive
impact  during  those  twenty-five  years,  but  I  would  deduct  from that
some of the  subsequent  adjustment  costs that were associated  with
adjusting  expectations  downward  to  a  more  sustainable  level.
As a basis  for  looking  ahead,  given  that  I think  it is  not
unreasonable  to make the claim that there  is not much more of a
productivity  gap -o  close  between  the  major  countries. I think  it
is safe to start  out  with the  assumption  that  maybe the  underlying
secular  trend,  wherever  it  comes  from,  may  have reasserted  itself.
Raising  growth  And the question  then becomes:  Are there  factors  that
relative  to  its  would  allow  us,  temporarily  perhaps,  to  ra,se  growth  relative  to  this
trend...  underlying  trend  of  perhaps  2-1/2  to  3 percent  -- are  the  faccors
that  would allow  us to raise  growth  relative  to that  or are chere
factors  that  would  tend to  suggest  that  growth  might  accually  turn
out co  be weaker  than  this  trend?
I believe  that  it  is  the  positive  factors  which  will  emerge
--  and it is  mainly  the  positive  factors  you  have  been looking  at -
- I would  agree-  with most  of what Boltho  has said -md what he has
written in his interesting  paper.  But I would also very much
emphasize  the  possible  gains that  might  arise  from further trade
liberalization,  particularly  in the  area of agricultural  policies.
This  could  provide  a significant  boost  to  potential  upward  growth  in
Japan,  in  Europe  and  in the  United  States.
I would also, in general,  emphasize  the contribution  of
micro  policies  to  structural  reforms,  although  it  is  hard  co  quancify
or  measure  them.
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One example  of how tills  could influence  and stimulate
growth  is,  of  course,  in the  area  of labor  markets. It is  importanc
to  distinguish  between  the  kind  of  pollcies  that  might  stimulate  the
underlying  growth  path,  raise  total  factor  productivity  and  polIcies
that could help us to better  absorb some of the under-utilized
resources  in the  labor  market.
That  is,  create  some  kind  of  level  shifts  if labor  markets
began  to  function  better,  which  presumably  would  be  associated  with
low inflation,  and would allow policies to become if not more
expansionary then,  certainly in  many  countries, become less
restrictive.  So  while  this  may  not,  over  a  longer  period,  raise  the
underlying  growth  race,  I  think  it  might  temporarily  allow  us to  grow
at a faster  rate than  the  underlying  potential  rate  of  growth.
However,  it is very important  also to look  at the  other
side  of that  coin,  the  opposite  side. I think  there  are  some  uncer-
tainties  and  risks. And  just  to  mention  a  few,  I think,  for  example,
that  there  is  a  major  risk  that  we  underestimate  the  pressure  on
demographic  consumption  and,  therefore,  the  potential  impact  on  the  aggregate
factors...  investment  ratios  in  the  industrial  countries,  and  to some extent
also  in  developing  countries.  Alchough  for  other  reasons,  because  or
demographic  developments,  in the  industrial  countries  linked  to the
aging  of  populations,  this  is  going  to  become  a very  critical  factor
in  determining  how  the  overall  pie  is  being  shared  and therefore  how
much  of aggregate  income  will  be invested  in the  future.
And if there  were  no other  factor,  I  would  definitely  say
that in the case of Japan, this would clearly suggest that the
aggregate  savings  ratio  and  investment  ratio  and  therefore,  potential
growth rate necessarily  would have to be reduced in the future
relative  to  what  was  experience  in the  1950s  and  1960s.
Environmental  Likewise,  the  one  area where  I believe  a lot  of research
damage...  is  necessary  and  probably  will  be done in  coming  years  is the  ques-
tion of how the environmental  constraint  is going to affect the
productivity  of capital. How  large  a share  of  new investment  in the
years  ahead  will  be  reserved,  so  to  speak,  to  try  to  limit  the  degree
of further  environmental  damage.
There  may  well  be  other  reasons  to  be  concerned  that  we  may
not  even  be  able  to  maintain  this  underlying  long-term  secular  growth
trend  in the  future.
MR.  BANETH:  Growth  is  like  a  bicycle. Lf it  slows  down
too much, it may fall.  And I personally  believe  that because  of
both political  and social  restraints,  as you fall below  or try to
stay  at  2.5  percent,  the  long-term  outcome  may  in  facc  be  much  slower
growth.
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The  Triffln  I would  like  to come  back to  a  couple  of issues. One  of
paradox...  them  is  the  broadening  of the  Triffin  paradox  Andrea  Boltho  referred
to;  what  is  its  impact  on the  slowdown? And  how  does  one  resolve  the
current  disequillbrla?
By broadening,  I  mean  very  roughly  that  what  Triffin  said
is that the  dollar  exchange  system  was not tenable  because  it was
built  on the  accumulation  of deficits  of one country,  and at some
point  the  financing  of that  would  stop.
But the  desire  for  surpluses  has  not  necessarily  stopped.
The  problem  was  sort  of circumvented  in the  1970s  by the  dei'eloping
countries  becoming  suddenly  very  desirable  borrowers. Everybody  at
the time  agreed  that they  were creditworthy,  but we know how that
ended.  To some extent  in the  1980s  the  U.S. came back and  played
the  same  role,  but  who  can  play the  role  now?
SustaInability  If the  surplus  countries  argue,  in  a sense,  that  disequi-
of the  payments  librium  Is  desirable  --  which  is  to  some  extent  normal  partly  because
imbAlances...  of the  aging  of populations  and  partly  for  other  reasons  --  that  to
some  extent,  surpluses  are  desirable,  how  can  one  find  corresponding
solvable  deficits,  deficits  which  make this  situation  tenable?
If  it  is  in  fact  tenable,  what  is the  financing  innovation,
the  financing  mechanism  which  will  allow  us to  go on in the  medium-
run,  without  reducing  the  deficit?
The  question  is: How do  we render  this  current  situation
sustainable,  either  by building  up the  financial  means  of  maintain-
ing the same deficits,  or by reducing the imbalances,  or by a
combination  of the  two?  And  what are the  implications  of this  for
long-term  growth  in  general? I see  a common  thread  in the  various
statements.  That is that the mounting  of inflationary  pressures
through structural  changes (possibly  generated by  the Keynesian
consensus)  in  fact  prevent  the  appllcation  of sufficiently  stimula-
tive macroeconomic  policies,  or pushes towards  more restrictive
macroeconomic  policies.  What are the relations  of this to the
unwinding  of deficits?
MR.  ARMINGTON:  I  would  just  add  a footnote  that  perhaps
there is a golden rule lurking  in the woodwork  here --  a 2-1/2
percent solution  for growth.  We just didn't do enough  work on
economic  history  to  appreciate  that  ten  years  ago.
the  2-1/2  But just to throw  out a question  about  that:  it is true
percent  that  there  was  a  reasonable  consensus,  ten  years  ago,  that  the  growth
solution...  trend of industrial  countries  was at least 3-1/2 percent.  For
example,  the  1979  World  Development  Report  was  not  outside  the  range
of commonly-discussed  estimates  at that  time,  projecting  an average
growth  rate  in  the  1980s  of 3-1/2  percent  to 4-1/4  percent. Now  we
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are talking  about a full percentage  point less than that,  as the
percelved  underlying  trend  for the  future.
Were we just too  optimistic  at that  time  about technical
progress?  (We were probably  not  that far wrong on population
growth.) Or are  we now  being  too  pessimistic?
MR.  PERRY: What do we do about some of these  imbalance
issues  on the  realistic  assumption  that  growth  alone  doesn't  get us
out  of them?
More  on the  The  overhang  of the  dollar  is  another  imbalance,  and  it  is
Imbalances..,  also  a very  serious  problem. It inhibits  investment  a  great  deal  to
have the  kind of currency  instabilities  that  we have had. I think
that  we have  had an experiment  which  has failed,  basically,  and it
has failed  because  the dollar  went up much too high,  and then it
threatened  to  go down too  low.
If you look at what is happening to investment,  just
"prospects' for  conducting normal  expansions, this  currency
instability  has turned  out to  be  a serious  problem.
The  initiative  that  ought  to  be taken  over the  medium-run
has to  do  with  finding  a  new  way  of  dealing  with  exchange  rates  other
than the  experiment  we have had.  We need a more realistic  answer
than hoping  for more government  cooperation,  which is sort of a
medium-run  hope  presented  in the  paper  by  Boltho.
But there  is a short-term  answer,  whlch Is  attempting  to
stabilize  the dollar  at the present  level.  It would probably  be
constructive  and ought to be successful  and ought not to involve
perverse  policies  on the  part  of the  U.S.
We  are  just  beginning  that  experiment  in  stabilization  and,
anywhere  around  present  exchange  rates,  the  markets  will cooperate
if  governments  will  convince  them. They  are  determined.  Markets  are
not closely  bounded  by fundamentals,  and  when we economists  try to
model  this  thing  as though  there  are  fundamentals  and  you  can't  fight
them,  we  miss the  point,  which  is  that  neicher  we nor  the  market  can
estimate  such  fundamentals  well  at all.
All  the  markets  are  chasing  is  what  is  going  to  happen  next
month. It is  not  really  hard  to  convince  them  that  what is  going to
happen  next  month  is  a  stable  dollar. Doing  that  would  be  a  genuine-
ly  constructive  step  to take  in the  present  context.
If  you  can  establish  that,  I think  you  can  look  forward  to
both lower  real interest  rates  and better  investment  prospects.  If
the instability  that we have seen in exchange  markets continues,
because  what I am suggesting  isn't  pursued vigorously  enough to
succeed,  then  things  like  a collapse  of equity  markets,  and  ongoing
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reluctance  about Investing,  are likely  to continue  to plague us.
The  calamity  scenario  runs  off  of  currency  instability  at this  moment
of tlme.
MR. LIPSCHITZ:  I would  like to comment  on some  of the
points  made.
I think  Perry  Is  exaggerating  a bit In  saying  there  is no
evidence  agalnst the view that demand stlmulus could solve our
problems. It  seems  there  Is  a  mountain  of evldence  In  the  literature
on why unemployment  Is high, trying to separate  classical  from
Keynesian  aspects  of the  present  unemployment  problem.
debt/GNP  On the  other  questions  raised: First,  on flscal  stimulus
ratios...  in  Europe,  why  should  it  be that  debt/GNP  ratios  or fiscal  positions
of the  sort  we have In the  United  States  now,  give rlse  to alarm,
but  similar  ratios  for  Germany,  for the  Netherlands,  for  the  Scandi-
navian  countries,  do  not  give  rise to  alarm?
Pollcy  co-  On monetary  policy, anyone  who has looked  at what has
ordinatIon..,  happened  over  the  last  five  years  must  be  skeptical  about  the  choices
of monetary  policy  pushing  us  out  of slow  growth. We  know in  Europe
that it is the long-term  interest  rates tha. affect interest-
sensitive  components  of  demand. We  have  seen  central  banks  push  down
short-term  rates  and the long-term  rates rise or stay constant  in
response. This  Indicates  skepticism  on the  part of markets.
The  broad  question  that  has been  raised,  is  how  we set  up
a  system  of  policy  coordination  that  will  work.  What  are the  gains
from  coordination?  In the  last  few  years,  we have  witnessed  a  great
deal of optlmism  on coordlnation  slo1wly  give way to somewhat  less
sanguine  expectations  about  the  gains  from a coordinated  effort  at
exchange  rate  stabilization.
Clearly,  attempts  at stabilizing  the dollar in the way
George  Perry suggested,  haven't  worked  very well at all times.  In
most instances  markets  just  haven't  found  policies  credlble.
But  one  of  the  problems  might  well  be that  Amerlcans  under-
stand  very  little  of  the  problems  of  Europe  and  are  not  persuasive  in
talking  about  Europe,  and I suspect  vice-versa;  that  sometimes  when
one listens  to this  debate,  it  sounds  like  a dialogue  of the  deaf.
On the  question  of the  system  per se, of course  there  is
a  wealth  of literature  on  how  we  should  set  up  a  new  monetary  system,
literature  around  the  EMS question,  wriK  by Ron  McKinnon  on a new
fixed-exchange-rate  system  with symmetric  policy  responses  so that
the  U.S.  doesn't  have  a free  ride.
The  problem  with a lot  of that  literature  is that it has
dealt exclusively  with financial  shocks  rather than real shocks.
What  work there  has  been  on policy  coordination  in the  face  of real
shocks  Is,  I am afraid,  still  at a rather  primitlve  stage.28
PART  II
(Afternoon  Session: 2:30  p.m.)
MR.  BANH:  I  would  like  Mr.  Steve  Marris  to  continue
hls  analysis  [that  he  started  during  lunch]  of  slightly  gloomy  short-
run to  the  buoyant  medium/longer-run  outlook  for the  world  economy.
MR.  MARRIS:  Let  me try  to  look  beyond  the  hard  landing.
This is something  I am starting  to  try  and  think  about. You  always
need to be counter-cyclical  in our business. So my next book is
probably  going to be about the  dangers  of the  dollar  going up too
soon  and too  muchl
Inflatlonary  But  taking up where I  left off  I  believe that the
recession  in  beginnings  of an inflationary  recession  in the United  States  are
the  Unlted  inevitable. What exactly  is the timing  I am not sure, and this
States...  recession,  of course,  is  an unusual  recession  for the  United  States
because  it  is  ecternally  generated. That  means  that  there  are  three
things  which  a;..e  completely  out  of line  with  NBER  cyclical  indicator
approach  to  recessions.
The recession  starts  with interest  rates  going up rather
than  going  down.  It starts  with  inflation  staying  up  or going  up
rather  than  coming  down.  On the  other  hand,  it  also  has built  into
it  a very  strong  boost  to the  economy  coming  from the  lower  dollar.
Do  Jones to  The  configuration  that  it  points  to is a recession,  which
"1000'  plus  In  the  financial  markets  of the  world  starts  looking  rather  horrible.
something...  It is  generated,  in  fact,  by  financial  phenomena.  The  Dow  Jones  goes
down to "1,000"  or so.  Interest  rates  peak,  go up.  The long  term
Long-term  rates rate,  I  maintain,  will  go  up to  12  or  13  percent,  and  this  incredible
will rise..,  euphoria  in  which this  country  [the  United  States]  has been living
for  quite  a while  will  blow  up.
But  precisely  because  the  whole  thing  is  unrolling  fairlv
slowly  and because  the  dollar  has already  been down  far enough  for
long  enough  to  be  giving  a strong  boost,  we  are  now  getting  anywhere
between  1/2  to  1 percent  of  GNP  per  annum  improvement  in  real terms
in  the  external  balance,  and  I think  it's  absolutely  inevitable  that
it  will  continue  for  another  two  to chree  years.
The recession  may start  as a sharp  one and look racher
nasty,  but  it  will be short-lived.  And then  we get to the  feedback
onto the  political  scene.
U.S.  budget  I am confidently  predicting  that  the  U.S. budget  deficic
deflcit  will be  will be eliminated  within  the  next --  I  mean,  action  will be caken
eliminAted...  which  will lead  to the  elimination  of the  U.S. budgec  deficic  --
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18 months  to three  years, because  the  market  will demand  a policy
change: wlth the  Dow Jones  at "1,000"  and Interest  rates  up, che
deficlt  wlll  have  to be ellmlnated.
So  part  of  my  scenario  is  that  (a)  we  wlll  have  a  recession
in the  United  States;  and (b)  that  the  natural  forces  are  such that
there  is  a potential  for  a strong  recovery,  and that  eventually  is
consolidated  by exactly  the  Thatcher  phenomena,  i.e.  that  a convinc-
ing  package  of budget  cuts  by enabllng  one  to sort  of stabilize  the
dollar,  get down interest  rates  and  generally  convince  people  that
what is wrong  is being  fixed;  this  will lead,  In  fact,  to a strong
recovery  In  the  United  States.
So within  a time  horizon  of two  years out (1990-1991,',  1
am really  rather  optimlstic  about the  U.S.  I think  that the  U.S.
economy  is indeed  still  a very flexible  and dynamic  economy,  which
is  being  remarkably  borne  out  by  what  is  happening  In  the  manufactur-
ing  sactor. In  particular,  I  find  remarkable  the  speed  of the  swing-
around  in that  sector.
Now  having  said  that,  there  is  In  my  view  one  enormous  sort
of Damocles  hanging  over the  U.S.  economy. A recession  is golng  to
do  wonders  for  the  trade  balance.  If  you  go back  and  look  in  my book
[Deficits  and  the  Dollar: The  World  Economy  at Risk],  you  will  find
that  in the  "hard-landing"  scenario  In  which  the  dollar  goes  down  not
very  much  more from  where  it  is now,  and  there  is  a relatively  mild
U.S.  recession,  the  U.S.  trade  current  account  goes  from  minus  150  to
plus 50 in the space  of three  years,  and that is with perfeccly
ordinary  elasticities  in the  model.
And, in fact,  I think  that Is  an underestimate. Part of
that  result  is,  of course,  because  imports  are so much higher  than
exports  before  the recession.  But the other thing is that I am
convinced  that  none  of  our  models  take  into  account  the  interreaction
between  price  elasticities  and  income  elasticities.  You  know,  whac
every  other  country  has  learned  is  that  If  you  combine  an  undervalued
exchange  rate with a recession,  miracles  happen.  I mean, they
happened  in  Brazil;  they  happened  in  Mexico;  they  used  to  happen  from
time  to time  in  France. And  I think  there  is every  likelihood  that
they  could  happen  in the  U.S.
Fluctuation  of  So the really  frightening  thought  is that somewhere  out
exchange  there,  18  months  to  2  years  from  now  perhaps,  the  dollar  is  going  to
rates...  start  shoocing  up.  Jusc remember  that the  dollar  was still  at its
trough  in the third quarter  of 1980 and it went up against the
Deutsche  Mark  by  about  40  percent  in the  next  12  months. And  within
12  months  the  forecasts  by  the  foreign  exchange  markets  were that  the
dollar  was  going  to  go down. In  other  words,  within  12  months  people
thought  the  dollar  had  gone up too  far, or at least  it  was not far
off  the  level  at which  it  should  have  been.
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And it can  move  unbelievably  fast.  There  are  people  all
over  the  world  walting  to  buy  up  America.  And  when  the  trade  deficit
has  gone  down  --  [although  not  in the  beginning  - but  at some  point,
it will] --  by a half or when it suddenly  gets to zero,  money is
going  to  come  pouring  In  from  all  over  the  world  into  the  U.S.
And that, in my view, if we now want to get  to the
transition  from the short-run  into the  medium  run, is the  crucial
linking  policy  issue,  because  I think  there  is a very serious  risk
that the dollar  will go up too soon and too much. and, in other
words,  the  dollar  will  not  stay  down  long  enough  at a  sensible  level
to really  reindustrialize  America  and reestablish  a basis  for the
dollar  as the  world's  currency  and  for the  United  States'  economy  as
a sort  of linchpin  of the  world  economy.
I suppose,  what we need is a crisis  serious enough  to
actually  be able  to  find  a moment  where  we can lock the  governments
into  a better  managed  exchange  rate  system,  but  not so serious  that
the  whole  thing  breaks  down  and  there  is  nothing  left  to  manage.
And the  story  there  is  absolutely  open.  I don't  think  we
know  what the  end  of that  story  is. But  I think  that  it  is,  in  terms
of the  longer-run  of the  world  economy,  a key  one, because  if I now
move  outside  the  United  States  the  most  encouraging  thing  is the  way
Japan has been able to turn  potential  domestic  demand  into actual
domestic  demand. And it  is really  becoming  quite  dramatic.
Yen  could  rise  And we have this picture of Japan and  the whole of
to  80?...  Southeast  Asia in really  very  good shape.  So that is one strong
point  in the  world  economy. I  still  think  that  the  Yen  at  some  point
could  rise to 80 [against  the  dollar]  but the  Japanese  have shown
their  pragmatic  attitudes  to  all these  things. [They  have taken  a
leaf out of Mrs. Thatcher's  book.]  And if they use all  these
proceeds  from  NTT  to  just  simply  boost  demand,  that  is quite  a lo.  of
demand  they  can  give themselves  over  the  next  year  or two. So,  they
may  pull through,  and  that  means  that  the  whole  of Southeast  Asia is
all  right.
If  we come  to Latin  America  and the  desert  countries,  my
all  too  simplified  view  is  this: The  debt  crisis  was  caused  by three
things  --  high  U.S. interest  rates,  a recession  in the  North,  and  a
strong  dollar.  . What is now going to hit them is a blip in U.S.
interest  rates,  but that  will  not last  very  long,  because  once the
U.S. economy  is  clearly  in  recession,  U.S. interest  rates  will come
down.  And looking  further  ahead, If something  is done with the
budget  deficit,  not  only  will  U.S. interest  rates  come  down,  but  we
might  get  back  to  a  sensible  level  of  U.S.  real  interest  rates  bv the
beginning  of the  next  decade.
There  is  going  to  be  a  recession  in the  North,  but  the  U.S.
economy  is  going  to  have  to  start  to  grow  well  within  two  years,  and
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that Is the  most important  market  for [the debtor]  countries. Of
course,  in the  longer-run,  It  Is  always  the  good thing  for  a debtor
country  to  see  a depreclatlon  in the  currency  of Its  creditor.
The  debt  And if you do any of the  debt calculus,  with the  dollar
calculus...  where  it is  now, there  Is  a cash  flow  problem  in the  short-run  with
a recesslon  and  temporary  bllp  In  U.S. Interest  rates,  but if  you  go
out  to  the  recovery  phase,  you  will  flnd  that  all  the  debt  lndlcators
for the  largest  debtor  countries  are  back  where  they  were  before  the
crisls  started;  they  are  back  to  mid-1970s  levels  In terms  of debtl
export  ratios  and  so on.
Disequilibrium  That leads me to Europe,  and there I think is a very
within  Interesting  story.  I suggest  to you that there  is as blg and as
Europe...  dangerous  a disequilibrlum  within  Europe  as there  has been between
the  U.S.  and the  rest  of the  world.
When we had the meeting  of the Group of 33, 1 had the
impression  that some part of the Improvement  in the German trade
position  was  not due  to  U.S.  but  was due  to the  rest  of Europe. [I
asked  if anybody  in the  room  could  to  give an estimate  of how much
the  improvement  in the  German  trade  balance  had  been,  at the  expense
of  the  rest  of  Europe.]  Somebody  who  has  followed  the  figures  fairly
regularly,  said,  "Oh,  yes,  you  are  quite  right;  it  must  be something
like  at least  25 to  30 percent. Which  is  roughly  the  sort  of idea  I
had in  my  mind.
The  German  [I then  went back  and  got the  figures:] Researching  the
trade  figures,  it showed  from 1983 to the  first half of :987 nearly  80
surplus...  percent  of the improvement  in the  German  trade  balance  was at the
expense  of the  rest of Europe.  That is equivalent  to nearly  one
percent  of the  GNP of the  rest  of Europe.
Use  a  foreign  trade  multiplier  of two,  and  you  have [up  to
1988]  a break  on growth  in the  rest  of Europe,  coming  from Germany,
of che  order  of two  percent  of GNP.
The time  trend  of this  is interesting. This really  only
started after the dollar started going down, and  it has  been
accelerating  ever  since,  because  in  fact the  EMS  has been  shielding
the Deutsche Mark and  it has  been pulling up  all  the ocher
currencies.  The other European economies  have also, curiously
enough,  because  off  the  defense  provided  by  the  EMS,  been  able  co  grow
faster than Germany.  So we had this amusing  situation  of four
locomorives  of Europe --  Portugal,  Spain, Italy and the United
Kingdom. [Anybody  knows  that  that  can't  last  very long.]
I  was  very  glad  to  see  chat  our  colleagues  at the  OECD  had
picked  this  up in  their  latest  outlook  [December  1987],  and  they  have
put  in the  figures  I  didn't  have,  which  show that  if  you  split  Europe
into  Germany  and the  rest,  the  rest  of Europe  struggled  into  a small
WP/BOXXTO/8F:g32
current  account  surplus  in 1987,  when the  United  States  was  running
a current  account  deficit  of $160  blllion.
And  that  even  in  the  OECD's  proJection,  which  has  a  fairly
modest  improvement  in the  U.S.  current  balance  --  I think  it comes
down  to  $110  billion  by  1989  --  by  that  time  Germany  is  still  running
a  large surplus and the rest of Europe is in very substantial
deficit.
Germany  and the  [Ic  should  be  noted  that]  Germany,  via  the  EMS,  in  my view.
EMS ..  . ......  exerted  a very  valuable  deflationary  or  anti-inflationary  effect  on
Europe,  in the  first  half of the  1980s.  I think  it was  necessary,
and  it  did  indeed  work. The  EMS  at that  point  was  a vehicle  through
which  the  Bundesbank  imposed  anti-inflationary  discipline  on  the  rest
of Europe,  and  that  was  probably  what  was  needed.
From  the  monent  that  the  dollar  [started  to  go)  down,  [the
situation]  has  turned  around. The  EMS  has  been  a  mechanism  which  has
been shielding Germany from the consequences  of  its extremely
cautious  economic  policies  and,  of course,  what this  means  is that.
if  Germany  really  wishes:  [it  could)  go on with low  growth,  and .ts
generally  pessimistic  view  about  its  demographic  position  and  every-
thing  else.  That is its  own  right.  But the issue  of whether  the
rest of Europe  is prepared  to do the  same I think  is now  becoming
rapidly  a central  issue.
In  fact,  1988-89  may  be [the  period]  in  which  it is  Europe
that  suddenly  emerges  as  one  of the  major  stress  points  in the  world
economy,  unless  Germany  begins  to  grow  at a faster  pace.
It seems  to  tuie  that  It  is  very  clear  now  that  we have this
massive  disequilibrIuw  within  Europe. And  the  question  is: How  long
can Germany  go oin  like this?  And what happens  when the rest of
Europe  reaches  the  end  of its  tether?
MR.  BANETH:  How  does  the  unwinding  of the  U.S. deficit
come  about  as long  as  you  don't  have the  unwinding  of the  surplus  in
Europe  (Germany)?
Dollar,  DM and  MR. MARRIS:  There  are two things.  If you look at
Yen...  German  economic  policy  over  the  last  few  months  (latter  part  of 1987
and  early  1988),  it  has  been  directed  exclusively  at trying  to  main-
tain  the  EMS. And  indeed  they  have  made  concessions  to  the  French  in
operating  their  interest  rate policy  and so on, because the only
thing  which  will change  German  policy  is the  breakdown  of the  EMS.
And equally,  it seems to me, the only way in which a
significant  reduction  of the  U.S. deficit  can come about,  without
leading  to  a  real  mess-up  in  Europe,  is  through  at least  a  15  percent
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appreclatlon  of the  Deutsche  Mark (DM)  against  the  other  European
currencles,  even If the  Germans  were to take a more expansionary
action.
There  Is  a grldlock  of  political  and economic  bottlenecks
there,  which It seems  to me are bound to blow  up once the  current
nominal  value  of the  U.S.  current  deflcit  begins  to  fall  at the  same
rate  as the  real  one.
MR. ARMINGTON:  That also probably  Implies  a fairly
large  appreciation  of the  DM against  the  dollar. I mean  the  break-
down  of the  EMS  Is  not  Just  going  to  change  currencies  within  Europe,
but  the  DM is  going to  be exposed  as the  key  undervalued  currency.
MR.  HARRIS:  The  Yen,  of course,  was fully  exposed,  and
the effective  Yen  has gone up probably  nearly  35 percent  by early
1988,  whereas  the  trade  weighted  DM went up  about  10  or 12  percent,
because  it  was living  off the  rest  of Europe.
MR. BANMTE7:  I find there  is a bit of inconsistency
between  your  rather  optimistic  prediction  about  the  unwinding  of the
U.S. deficit,  and your pessimism  concerniaig  the unwindlng  of the
corresponding  German  surplus.  How would the developing  countries
get out of (if only they survive)  "the 500 degree heat of the
furnace"  for  a couple  of years.
Again,  I don't  think  that  Is  fully  consistent  with  some  of
the  rest  of the  story,  including  the  impact  of the  likely  rebound  of
the  U.S.  dollar,  and  the  likely  slowdown  in  growth  and  corresponding
impact  on primary  commodity  prices.
MR.  MARRIS:  Unless  something  is  done  to  stop the  dollar
rebounding,  then  we  are  in  trouble.  If  something  is  done  to  stop  the
dollar  rebounding,  (I still  would  say  that I think)  che  conditions
for a decade  of four percent  growch  in the world economy,  in the
industrial  economies,  a  new  "golden  period",  not  necessarily  as long,
are  very  good. I  think  the  general  underlying  conditions  for  resumed
fast  growth  in the  world  economy  are  excellent.
The  maln  reason  I ended  w.tth  that  digression  on Europe  is
that the  questicn  of whether  It can be done  without  Europe  somehow
putting  its  act together  is  relevant;  well  I am  not  sure. Europe  is
four times  more important  as an importer  of commod.-ties  than che
United  States. It is  particularly  important  in  a set  of triangular
trade  relations  with  the  developing  countries,  convinced  that  I  could
put together  my optimistic  scenario  for the '990s  without  assuming
that somehow or other, at  the end of  the line, the Europeans
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straighten  out  their  mess. And,  you  know,  I  am much  less  optimistic
[about  that than  I am about  the  U.S.]
MRfl.  BAM  :  ZI thlnk  this  leads  us back to  some  of the
questions  which  were  opened  earlier: In  particular  about  Profes;or
Boltho's  assumption  on the  endogenelty  of technical  change,  or the
absence  of  a problem  In technologles.
MR.  OHLIZ:  Could  I  perhaps  say  Just  a few  words  about
why  I think  this  might  be Important  for the  1990s.
What  will  be of  What I have In mind is that there  are certain  imporcant
importance  in  analogies  with the 1920es'  and the 1930s in the magnitude  and the
the  1990s?  extent  of structural  change,  and the  sectoral  differences  in
manufacturing,  and the whole high-tech business, the difference
between  high-tech  and  smokestack  industries.
The reason  why  I thought  it  was  worthwhile  brlnging  this
question  up  was that  we  are  all  aware  of the  pervasive  importance  of
the electronic  technological  revolution.  It affects everything.
There  is no point  In looklng  Just at the  high-tech  industry  Itself
because  it  has  a  productivity  enhancing  effect  elsewhere.
And the  point  about  this  Schumpeterian  perspective  which
I  briefly  referred  earlier,  is that,  after  this  period  in  which  new
technology  slows  thlngs  down  or  displaces  more  Jobs  than  it  creates,
when that  whole  process  of absorption  is over,  you come  back co the
productivity  enhancing  effect  of technological  growth. And this  is
after  all the  whole  point.
Benefits  of  So  on  that  view  briefly  sketched  of the  1990s,  the  benefits
technological  of technologlcal  change  in the  1980s  are  reaped  in the  1990s  essen-
change...  tially,  i.e.  they  are  not  reaped  right  away. It takes  some  time to
absorb  them.
If you  look at industry  after industry,  you  find an
enormous  retooling,  obsolete  technologies,  also  the  capital  equipment
being  replaced  with modern electronically-guided  equipment  and so
forth,  and  it  is  very  similar  to  the  whole  thing  in  the  1920s,  which
was referred  to as structural  rationalization  and so forth.  The
merger  business  is  also  part  of that,  the  tremendous  reshaping  of the
organizational  structure  of important  branches,  a new pattern of
concentration,  new  companies  taking  over  and  so  forth.
I  think  there  is  evidence  of this  kind,  but  it  is  obviously
not  easily  measured. You  have  to take  a different  kind  of view  from
that  which  one  can  do with  simply  active  statistics.
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MR. VERSLUYSE:  I have a question  on this  impact  of
technology.  It  was  mentioned  that  there  Is  a  new  pattern  of concen-
tration  In Industry. I thought  that the  main beneficlal  Impact  of
micro-computer  technology  In the  1980s  was to enable  firms  to reap
the  benefits  of  Increasing  returns  to  scale  without  having  to  have  a
large-scale  industry.
If  you  look  at  a  lot  of  statistics,  particularly  in  Japan,
but I  think  also  In  the  U.S.,  the  momentum  for  the increase  of
employment  in industry  has in fact been  in small  companies. This
may  diminish the volatility  of  employment.  Unemployment  will
continue  to  Increase  in the  major  smokestack  Industries,  out  will b6
partly  offset  by  modernized  new  small  enterprises.  The  increments  in
productlon  come  from  small  companies.
MR.  MARRIS:  I think  the  one thing  I  am impressed  by is
that  the  electronic  technological  revolution  is,  it  seems  to  me, the
nicest  one  we have  ever  had.  It is so  general. It is both  product
Innovation  and  process  Innovation.  it  can  be  used  anywhere. It  has
this  characteristic  which is that  it can stimulate  competition  and
decentralization.  You  know,  it Is  not like  most  of the  big  driving
forces which would displace geographically --  where people have to
shift  from  agriculture  to  industry  or move  from  Europe  to  America.
It seems  to me we are  on the  leaf  of the  lucky  with this
one, and,  as long  as we keep the  world  going  at a reasonable  pace,
this  one  will  work  out  extremely  well,  and  probably  be  pretty  highly
productive.
MR.  ARMINGTONV:  If  we do  wind  up  with,  say,  2.5  percent
growth  characterizing  the  whole  of the  1980s,  that  performance,  in
retrospect,  may  turn  out  to  be  considerably  better  than  we would  have
expected  without  reference  to  a technological  foundation  for  it.  In
the  1980s,  the  demand  side,  the  policy  side,  and the  monetary  side
have  not been  conducive  to  growth. Given  that,  the  question  is  how
did  we manage  to  do  as  well  as 2.5  percent,  if  this  is  near  our  view
of the  long-term  growth  trend  for the  future?
It  may  be that  we  will  wind  up looking  for  some  difficult-
to-measure  reason  why  we  managed  to  get  as  much  as  2.5  percent  annual
growth  in  the  198Cs,  and  hence  come  back  to the  technological  revolu-
tlon  as  a supportive  factor. If so,  well,  then,  of  course,  there  Is
a potential  for  3.5  percent,  or even  4  lorcent  growth  In the  1990s,
if you can get through  some of the problems  that Mr. Marris is
talking  about.
More  on  MR. LINN:  How  much of a normative  dimension  is chere
:echnology...  to  the  discussion  of technology?  I  am  a bit  worried  that  It doesn't
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get  us  anywhere  In  terms  of Informing  what  should  be  done  in  the  next
two  or three  years  [1988-1990]  in  terms  of  policy,  because  I  suspect
that  pollcy  prescriptions  for the  next two  or three  years or even
outer  years  are  going  to  be  pretty  much  the  same,  whatever  we  believe
Is in  fact  on technological  opportunities.
Successful  technology  policies,  whatever  they  are,  may  jack
up  our  estimates  of  potential  growth  rates  by 1/2  percent,  maybe  even
1  percent  in  other  outer  years,  but  my impression  is  it is  not  a  very
fruitful  ground  for  policy  discussion.  Would  that  be  a biased  view?
What can  we do in terms  of a policy  perspective?
The  best thing  we can  probably  do is to  make sure  invest-
ment takes  place so that  new technology  gets embodied. And that
means that  we have to somehow  cr&"k  up investment,  bring interest
rates  down. Incidentally,  that  Is  a  general  question  I  would  like  to
discuss  in the long-term  outlook,  what happens to interest  rates,
real  interest  rates,  which  is  not  something  that  Boltho  really  looks
at [In  his  paper). But  that  may  in  fact we  one  of the  crucial  policy
variables  that  affect  technological  absorption  and implementation.
MR. BANETH:  I  think the policy implications  are
indirect,  and  we are not going to discuss  very much how one  would
promote technological  change or  its embodiment except through
investment.
But  very  much  in  the  background  and  indeed  In  the  forefront
of  German  reluctance,  up to now, to stimulate  the economy  is, at
least  at the  verbal  level,  the  argument  that "we  are close to,  or
indeed  above,  our  potential  growth  rate." And if you want to  work
that  further,  it has to imply  the lack  of available  teehnology  to
embody  in the  capital. You  have  no increase  in  the  labor  supply,  and
basically  you  can  have  a 1.5  percent  per  annum  productivity  increase
because,  no  matter  how  much  investment  you  have,  that's  about  all  the
technological  change  you  can  embody  in  it.
Conversely,  if  there  is  a  general  feeling  that  in  fact  you
do  have  the  technology  available  for  embodying  into  capital,  which  is
not  yet embodled,  you can  have  faster  change,  and this removes  one
constraint  on policy.  One could then  have faster  growth  without
inflation.  Indeed,  if you do have these  autonomous  pressures  on
wages, if wages are marching  forward  at a  certain  rate, then  you
might  in  fact  have  a  negative  tradeoff  between  growth  and inflation,
if the  technology  is  available.
Structural  MR.  OHLIN:  There  are  two  points. I think  the  negative
chang.......  one is the  rapidity  of the thing. The acceleration  of structural
changes,  the  rapidity  or the  acceleration  of structural  changes  in
the  1970s  and 1980s,  for that  matter  you can  go back  almost  to the
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end  of the  1960s,  give  rise  everywhere  to  policies  which  ostensibly
were meant  to promote  this.  Industrlal  policy  was the  name of the
game for a long  time,  and that  turned  into,  In most cases,  devices
for  actually  slowing  down  structural  change,  from trying  to  promote
and beef up the sectors  that were threatened. And we know what
excesses  of subsidies  that  led  to. So  structural  change  was  actually
slowed  down  rather  than  stepped  up.
The other  point  which Is  related  to this  Is the  question
of  what  happens  to  this  process  of  structural  change  with  the  kind
of  exchange  rate  fluctuations  that  we  have  had  and  the  misalignment
phenomenon  that  has been  talked  about  so  much.
Well,  we know  that  people  closed  down  capacity  in the  U.S.
in  the  days  of the  high  dollar,  and  the  question  of the  costs  of this
kind  of  premature  adjustment  to  a  level  (whlch  turns  out,  a  few  years
ago, to be  totally unrealistic)  does ralse some very serious
questions  of cost-benefit  for che adjustment  of capacity  and the
appraisal  of competitiveness  and  so forth.  You  don't  know  what  you
are  adjusting  to.
PROFESSOR  BOLTHO:  I  will try  to reply  to some  of the
points on the longer-run  growth issue starting  with Mr. Ohlin's
comments.
Determinants  of  The  growth  process  is  very  complic.ted;  there  are  a  number
long-run  of ("N")  factors  at  work that  determine  the  long-run  growth  rates  of
rowt.......  industrialized  economies.  But  If  'N"  were  a  very  large  number,  would
we cross  our  arms  and  forget  about  it?
That is  why I  was trying  --  as I  have done  in my paper  --
to be perhaps  assertive  by stressing  the  role of Investment,  and I
am  going  to  stick  to  my  view,  partly  because  I  am  not  just looking  at
150  years  of  growth;  I  am trying  to  look  at  periods  of acceleration,
during  which  some  of those  forces  which  Goran  Ohlin  mentioned  I  don't
think  played  that  much  of a role. That is  particularly  true  of the
sort  of  micro  policies,  the  human  capital,  the  efficient  administra-
tion,  which  are a common  feature,  more or less  a common  feature  of
all the economies  I am looking  at, a feature  which has progressed
steadily  through  tlme.
Such a fairly  steady  movement  which  can't  explain  sudden
decelerations  or  accelerations.  There  must  be  something  else  at  play
-here.  That something else could indeed be  technology  a  la
Schumpeter.  There  I think  it  is  a  question  of  how  one  interprets  the
evidence.
My reading  of the  evidence  does  not  suggest  that  there  are
such  non-linearities  in technology.  There  may  be inventions  but  noc
in  adaptation  of technology.
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I  don'  t  think  technology  Is  a  sort  of  permanent  two  percent
trend  or "N"  percent  trend  which  never  changes. I think  It  is very
closely  llnked  to  the  business  cycle  (i.e.  the  absorption  of  techno-
logy  into the  economy). So It is  not exogenously  given in the  way
neo-classical  theory  would  assume. But  at the  same time,  It is  not
something  that  varies  very  sharply  because  of factors  other  than  the
cycle.
So  I  still  have  got to  find  something,  and  this  something,
In  my case,  Is  investment.  This  then  brings  me to  future  growth,  and
to  Flemming  Larsen's  point  that  perhaps  2.5  percent  per  annum,  is  the
underlying  long-term  trend. You  know,  we have  had it for 150  years
with the  exception  of  20 years;  we  will be stuck  with it  forever.
That to  me is  far too  fatalistic. It may turn  out to  be
true,  but  I don't  think  there  is  any  particular  reason  why  2.5  pe.-
cent  growth  should  be the  norm  for  industrialized  countries.
What could improve  on that performance?  Steve Marris
sounded  much  more  optimistic  than  I  actually  would  have  sounded,  and
he is talking,  r  presume,  about 4 percent some time in the next
decade.
What  could  bring  us to  such  a  higher  growth  rate? The  only
thing  that  the  Fund  has  to  recommend,  as  both  Flemming  Larsen  and
Leslie  Lipschitz  have  been  saying,  is  policies  of  deregulation.  That
is the  one thing  which they  seem  to consider  could  bring  about the
expected  acceleration  in  growth.
Frankly,  I  am  far  from  convinced.  For  one  thing,  the  1950s
and the 1960s  were almost  certainly  a period  in which regulations
Increased,  in which  the  Welfare  State  became  more "oppressive";  in
which  labor  legislation  got  more  binding. Yet  our  growth  went  on  and
on and  on,  apparently  unperturbed  by [these  events). What  I am not
saying  is that it doesn't  look  as if these  micro distortions  were
quite  as important  as people  tried  to  make them  out to be.
I  don't want to say that if one reforms agricultural
policies  in  Japan  or Europe  or America,  that  won't  be a  good thing.
On the  contrary  such  reforms  may bring  about  a host of benefits  to
tha industrial  countries.  But we can't quantify  this and in my
opinion  their  contribution  to the  growth  performance  is  perhaps  not
that  significanr.
On  the other hand, if you wanc,  the one  particular
deregulation  which  has  just  been  mentioned  has  had  extremely  serious
negative  consequences  for  our  growth  performance. I am thinking  of
deregulated  [foreign]  exchange  markets.  We have now got floating
exchange  rates  which  go up  and  down  all  over the  place  in  real terms
and they generate the negative  effects on investment  and on the
tradable  sector,  which  Steve  Marris  was  just  mentioning.
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So there  may  be  some  forward  seeps  that:  one  can  make  In  the
deregulation  area,  but It really  has been put at the  forefront  of
policy  concerns  to  a totally  unwarranted  degree.
What  to  my mind  would  be much  more important  --  and there
I  Joln  Steve  Marris  --  and  by  far  the  most  successful  transition,  is
one In  which  we come  out  of the  present  imbalances  with  a different
International  monetary  system  whlch  has a much greater degree  of
stability  in exchange  rates,  and combine that with some growth
stimulus  from the  fiscal  policy  side  of a concerted  kind.  Thls  may
regenerate  those  more  optimistic  expectations  which  to  my mind,  even
if  they  are  not  an  explanation  of  long-term  growth  for  two  centuries,
are  definitely  an explanation  for  specific  episodes  of acceleration
or  for that  matter  deceleration.
HR.,  MARRIS:  Basically  I very much agree  with Andrea
Boltho that  we are not golng to get self-levitating  growth, that
somehow  you  have  got  to  have  demand  and  have  optimistic  expectations
about  the  future  growth  of demand. That  I think  is crucial.
The 'liberal"  What  I  feel  is that  we  are  still  in  a too  industriocentric
market  view of the world, that the really important things that have
economy...  happened  in the  realm  of ideas  over the  last ten,  fifteen  years  has
been in the  developing  parts  of the  world.  [These  countries)  have
learned  a great  deal  about  the  necessary  types  of economic  policies
to produce  development. There  has been an absolutely  astonishing
revolution  or export  of the liberal  market economy  to just about
every  country  in  the  world,  Including  even  the  Soviet  Union,  although
that  will take  time.
PNow  the  one thing  we know is that in those  parts  of the
world,  you only  have to  get things  half right.  I have always  said
this: If  you  put  a  national  frontier  around  almost  any  piece  of the
earth,  whether  it  has  natural  resources  or  not,  if  you then  put in  it
a population  that is  poor  and starving,  has some  minimum  of educa-
tion,  and  provide  It with  some  degree  of political  stability  and  a
sensible sort of "liberal"  market economy outlook, you have a
miracle.  I mean,  every  time,  it has been  done, It has produced  a
miracle.
I think  probably  "liberal"  is the  wrong  word.  Neverthe-
less,  freer  markets  seem to be leading  to democracy  too,  which is
even  more  surprising,  and that  may  be in  fact :he  weakness,  because
maybe  the  democracies  will blow  up.  But it is the  economic  policy
that  relies  on  getting  both  the  key  macroeconomic  and the  key  micro-
economic  prices  right. And  we get miracles  --  even if  we can only
achieve  2.5  percent  growth  in the  industrialized  countries.
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I  would  like  to  pursue  this  issue  of the  feedback;  of the
Importance  of the  developing  economies  for  the  industrial  economies.
Feedback  from  First  we have the  small,  medium-sized  economies  which in
the  LDCs...  effect  are industrial  countries  except  by classification.  That is
Korea,  Taiwan,  Hong  Kong,  Singapore  are  Industrial  countries  by  every
crlterion  except  the  fact that  they  weren't  there  ten  years  ago.
And,  indeed,  once  you  put  them  in the  industrial  countries
and  you look  at the  industrial  countries'  growth  performance  in the
1980s,  you will find a slightly  different  number, not  terribly
different  because,  as industrial  countries  go, these  are still  not
very large  economies.
Then  you have the  macroeconomies,  India  and  China,  where
half the  population  of the developing  world are doing  reasonably
well.  But their  connections  to the  rest  of the  world,  I think,  are
not  very  strong. They  are  not  very  strong  in the  financial  sense  or
in terms  of international  trade. Nevertheless,  there  are some  con-
Diversity  nections  and  feedbacks.
wl thin  the
LDCs...  Then  I think  we have  a  very  heterogenous  group  of all the
rest,  which  in  weight  is  dominated  by che  highly-indebted  countries
- - simply because you have to be a fairly large economy to become
highly  indebted. Now what is the  feedback  we are expecting  from
these  various  groups  in the  rest  of the  decade,  in the  1990s?
PROFESSOR  BOLTHO:  Well,  partly  in response  to Steve
Marris:  sure, there is  a lot of world out there.  But there  aren't
a  lot  of miracles. There  are  a few  miracles  in  some  countries  which
are  doing  very  well,  and  a  few  which  are  doing  reasonably  well.  An
awful lot of them are not doing well at all.  And  I wouldn't
necessarily  draw that  simple  parallelism  between  export  or market-
oriented  policies  and  success.
Export-oriented  The  cases  which  have  often  been  looked  at,  South  Korea  and
economies...  Taiwan,  show  now that there  is a certain  amount  of market  orienta-
tion,  but  in the  1950s  and  1960s  there  was very  little  trace  of it.
It was much more a Japanese  type,  highly  intervencionist  strategy
that was being  followed. And conversely,  you can take  much more
market-orienced economies like several in Latin America --  Argentina
and Chile --  and they are hardly miracle stories.
I am not denying that in certain  circumstances,  markec
orientation  can  do the  trick  and  certain  deregulations  can  help,  but
I don't think  it is a blanket  recommendation  that can be made to
everybody.
In  any  case,  quite  a  lot  of these  success  stories  have  been
export-led.  Weli,  that  is  a  well-known  old  argument  now. Can  every-
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body  be export-led  vis-a-vls,  basically,  the  United  States? It  has
been the  United  States  which  has been  sucking-in  the  imports,  which
again  leads  me to the  feedback  issue.
These  countries,  the  really  successful  ones,  have  grown  in
the  1980s  mainly  because  of the  U.S.  Can they  change  their  growth
pattern to something  much more domestically  determined? I see no
trace  of it in  any of the  smaller  very  successful  countries. And,
therefore,  I find  it difficult  to  see them  [having  an impact  on  the
North.]
Japan is beginning  to do it.  Japan benefitted  from the
- rest of the  world  for a very long time.  It is  now  beginning  to
provide  a feedback,  mainly via the LDCs, directly,  and also for
Europe  or  America.
So I  would  be  skeptical  about  the  feedbacks  from the  small
very  successful  ones. The  large  and  the  reasonably  successful  ones,
as Steve Marris  says,  are autarchic,  particularly  China,  which is
both the  largest  and  among  the  most  successful.
There  again,  the feedback  seems  very limited.  The ones
which are much more open and less successful,  what feedback  can
expect  from  them? Unless  they  can  generate  a  self-sustained  domestic
growth  process  --  there  again  perhaps  the  only  other  possible  country
would be Brazil.  As I have emphasized  in my paper, (Can  we Grow
Rapidlv?],  whatever the dynamism  of Southeast Asia, I  find it
unlikely  that  these  countries  [the  Asian  NIEs]  are  going to be che
growth  pole  or the  locomotive  of  the  world  economy.  They  may  perhaps
be able  to  grow  relatively  rapidly  on their  own,  for  a long  cime.
MR. BANETH:  What  would it take to be a growth  pole?
Should  there  be only  one [pole  at any  given  time?]
Multiple  PROFESSOR  BRADFORD:  One  of  the  things  that  has  concerned
locus...  me in this  discussion  is:  Isn't  the  search  for  a single  engine  of
growth  part  of the  problem? Part  of the  juncture  we face,  I think,
unless  one  is  more  optimistic  than  I think  we can  be,  is that  either
the world  economy  turns towards  a return  to the trilateral  center
and  growth  pole  of the  world  economy  between  Japan  and the  U.S.  and
Europe,  or ic continues  on this  path that it has been on from the
early  1970s,  by incorporating  progressively  more economies  into che
world economy  that is, by increased  openness  in which case there
really  isn't  a  single  locus  for  growth  stimulus  in  the  world  economy,
but  a multiple  locus.
And that  is  why  a systemic  cooperative  solution  is  the  one
that  works  and  why  the  models  that  try  to  limit  a  focus  on the  large
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economles  do not show the  full  impact  of a cooperative  solution  on
the  world  economy  as  a  whole,  because  there  are  indeed  not  just three
loci,  if  you like,  but  rather,  in this  conception,  there  are  as many
as 25  or so  economies  which,  either  because  of their  size  or  because
of the  ratio  of  their  trade  shares  to  GDP,  are  crucial  to  the  overall
outcomes  of  global  economic  growth.
So it  is  a  much  more  diffuse  process  than  the  one  of seek-
Ing  where  the  center  of  gravity  of  world  economic  growth  is,  because
in  fact  there  isn't  one,  but  there  are  multiple  centers.
MR.  LINN:  Maybe  that  distinguishes  the  post-war  period
from  the  other  periods  of  growth,  namely  that  if  you  look  at the  data
on GDP growth  rates,  everybody  grew very  rapidly  at the  same time,
the  developing  countries  as  well  as the  industri.l  economics.  While
in the  earlier  periods,  the  Americans  were  growing  most rapidly  in
the  late  19th  century.
So the question  is:  Was it coincidental  that  halppened?
Is it something  that  won't  come  back?  Will you have these  smaller
growth  poles (such  as  East  Asia),  but  they  won't  be  able to  pull the
world  along  in the  future?  Or is there  a way through  coordinated
policies  to  get  everybody  to  come  back  up to  a, say,  3.5  percent  [per
annum]  growth  rate  together? One  group  of 25 percent  of  world  GDP,
one relatively  small  group,  growing  at 4 or 5 percent  [per annuml
isn't  going  to  do the  trick.
MR. BANETH:  I would like to come back actually  to
something  which  Steve  Marris  said,  about  the  movement  in the  weight
of the  developing  countries  in the  world  economy.
If we focus our attention  on the impact  of developing
countries  on the industrial  countries,  then I believe the answer
tends  to  be: relatively  limited,  because  there  are  a lot  of  develop-
ing  countries  that  are  so small  that  even together  chey  don't  weigh
much in the  international  economy.
If  we look  at the  Impact  of the  rest  of the  world  on some
of the  developing  countries,  I think  we  get  a somewhat  more  positive
answer. While  Mexico  or Brazil  or Korea,  may  not have much of an
impact  on the United  States  today,  they may play a role.  Their
weight  relative  co the  weight  of Africa  is not very dissimilar  to
the  weight  Europe  had  relative  to  Africa  30 years  ago.
And  in that  sense,  they  may  be increasingly  replacing  this
particular  growth  impulse  In  terms  of  demand  for  primary  commodities
and the  rest.
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Financial  MR. OHLI  I do miss the  question  of what the  trans-
markets.,..  nationalization  of many Important  and  particularly  dynamic  sectors
in  the  world  economy  means,  and  this  whole  perspective  of the  erosion
of the  national  state.
I don't  know  how seriously  to take It  and how far to  go.
But I do think  that  to  discuss  things  In terms  of  national  units  as
If  nothing  had  happened  is rather  difficult.
There Is no major company in the world now that isn't
producing  all  over the  place,  and it  allocates  according  to  what it
finds useful.  Does this only mean  that markets become more
effective,  or does  it add  some  new  dimension?
Similarly,  we have referred  to the new financLal  market
and  the  fact that  they  tend  to  drive  the  exchanAe  rate  system. But
we haven't really incorporated  the implication.I  of this and Its
tendency to  reduce  the  importance of  national  policymaking,
especially  in the  monetary  field.
Some people  who write about this perhaps overplay Lt.
Nonetheless,  I think  If  we are talking  about the  problem  of how to
get  more  stability  into  exchange  rates,  we  have  to  come  to  grips  with
the fact that  we have a totally  different  financial  market  in the
world  than  we used  to,  and  that  we have  been  assuming  or  hop,ng  that
coordination  of national  or macroeconomic  policies  could  do it.
There  are  lots  of references,  especially  in  the  Armington/
Fardoust  paper,  to this,  and In  the  draft  of the  paper  for  the  World
Development  Report. It seems  to  me that  these  discusslons  lead  one
to  the  conclusion  that  it  is  totally  unlikely  that  some  sophisticated
coordination  could  come  about.
You  have said  as much,  Jean (Baneth). You don't  believe
that  governments  would  be  able  to  do it. But  I  haven't  heard  anybody
suggest  what else  we think  might  possibly  be adopted.
There  is  a  reference  to  the  hope  or  fact,  in  the  Armington/
Fardoust  paper,  that  these  necessary  institutional  changes  will come
about  or history  will somehow  produce  them.  Can we guess In  what
direction  they  would  have to  go?
I would  think  they  would  have to  go in the  direction  of a
return to some kind of standard.  We were in the  global economy
before  the  First  World  War. We are  returning  to  a  global  economy  in
a  way,  and  yet  of course  we can't  have  a  gold  standard. So  what  kind
of standard  could  there  be?
I  must  say  I  have  been  amazed  at the  discovery  that  in  the
U.S.  Treasury  people  have been  quietly  studying  commodity  standards
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for decades,  and the  other day [Robert]  Heller  wrote in The Wall
Street  Journal  about  the  possibility  of a commodity  standard.
There  are  lots  of  other  people  around  who  feel that  sooner
or later  something  like  that  will  have to  be taken  seriously  again,
as it  was at various  times  in the  past,  for instance,  at the  first
UNCTAD  when  Kaldor  and  Hart  presented  a detailed  technical  proposal,
for  a  commodity  standard.
MR. O'BRIEN:  A  more  concrete  point  then  is:  [supposing
that]  we  have  in  the  technological  developments  of  the  1980s  the
seeds  of faster  growth  in the  1990s,  then  is that  actually  good for
the  non-OECD  countries,  for the  non-industrialized  countries? The
gap  between  where  they  are  and  where  the  industrialized  countries  are
is great enough  at the moment  for them to work a miracle  without
ac.ually  having to catch up on yet another  advance in the OECD
countries.
Linkage  between  MR. STEER:  On the linkage  between  OECD growth and
OECD  and  developing  countries,  I would  be interested  to know  whether  people
developing  think  that the  Armington  and  Fardoust  kind of numbers  make sense,
countries...  because  Professor  Boltho  said  just  a  minute  ago that  in  the  old  days
all the  fast-growing  developi.._  :ountries  really  did it because  we
were  growing  in the  OECD  countries  through  trade,  and  now they  have
got to learn  how to  do it  without  the  industrial  countries.
But unless  you look  at the  numbers  that  are presented  in
this  paper  by  Armingeon  and  Fardoust,  in  fact  you see  that  even  under
a rather  gloomy  OECD economic  situation,  the  2.5 percent  solution,
7ou  have  got  trade  growing,  if they  are  right  in  volume  terms  and  you
have  got the  terms  of trade  improving.
You  have  got  trade  growing  at  almost  exactly  the  same  rate,
well, slightly  lower  but not much lower than in the 1965 to 1986
period,  in  1990s.
I mean,  if these  numbers  are  right,  we really  must nip in
the bud Professor's  Boltho's  idea that the developing  countries
should  not rely  on OECD  and trade.
Now  these  numbers  may  be quite  wrong. In the  1965  to  1987
period  you  have  got  an average  3.3  percent  [per  annum]  GDP  growth  in
OECD,  which  permitted  export  volumes  of the  developing  countries  to
grow by 4.2 percent [per annum];  you have got a much lower OECD
growth in the  projected  period  [of about 2.8 percent  per annum],
leading  to  no lower  growth  in  LDC's  export  volume.
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Now you  have got terms  of trade  improving  for  developlng
countries,  not as much as they  did apparently  Li the  1965 to 1986
perlod,  but,  it still  looks  pretty  good.
MR. VERSIWJYSEN:  My lnterventlon  Is more out of
parochial  self-Interest  for  the  WDR (World  Development  Report  1988).
To the  extent  we make projections  [which  are not  forecasts]  in the
WDR, I could see a base case emerging  where a recession  doesn't
necessarily  take place,  but  world  economy gets locked  Into  a low
Hlgh  and  Low  growth  scenario  In the  near-term,  which  Is then  extrapolated  in the
Grovth  longer  term  through  the  end  of the  century  also  in low  growth. It is
Scenarios...  difficult  to  see  how  high  growth  can  result  after  a period  of low  or
no growth.
This  may  sound  paradoxical,  but  then  if  we  have  a low  case
and  a high  case  deviation  from  the  central  scenario,  I  could  see  the
high case  even  more paradoxical,  subject  zo a number  of qualifica-
tions;  that  the  high  case  would  in  fact  presuppose  in the  short-run
a recession,  but  a recession  which  can  then  only lead  to  a  high case
without  the  qualifications  of technology  and  possible  other  systemic
shocks. But  where  will the  main systemic  shock  come  from? Out  of  a
recession  come  two  things: that  the  individual  OECD  countries  would
not try each to grow out of the recession  on  its own but in a
concerted  fashion,  and that,  somehow,  greater  flnancial  disclpllne,
potentially  through  greater  aggravation  In the financial  m&Jkets,
particularly  the foreign exchange  markets,  would put checks and
balances  on the likelihood  that  the  dollar  would  bottom  out in the
very  near  future  and then  start  escalating  again  within  the  next  18
months.
So in a sense  the  shock that  comes  out of the recession
should  be a systemic  shock  which  also  brings  about,  galvanizes  the
wisdom and  the ability of  the various governments  to actually
cooperate  with  one  another.
MR. LARSEN:  Obviously,  the question  of the linkage
between  growth in the developing  countries  and in the industrial
countries  is  an extremely  crucial  aspect  of this  whole  discussion.
More  on the  I wonder if it would not be useful  to begin perhaps to
linkage....... explore  the possibility  that the link may be less strong  than we
believed  in the  past.  And, indeed,  as I read the  numbers,  I think
it  will  be very  difficult  to  defend  the  hypothesis  that  high  growth
in the  industrial  countries  is a  necessary  and sufficient  condition
for  high  growth  in the  developing  countries.
Indeed,  I  think  high  growth  in  the  industrial  countries  is
neither  a necessary  nor a sufficient  condition.  I .hink  what is
interesting  to  examine  is the  kind  of trade  performanc che  develop-
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Ing  countries  had  when  growth  was  hlgh  In the  Industrial  countries.
I thlnk  It Is  rather  dlsappolntlng  that  their  actual  growth  rate  was
only  4.2  percent  given  that  world  trade  growth  over  this  period  must
have  been  signlficantly  higher.
Exchange  rates  Now I wonder  if this  does  not have something  to do with
of developing  the  fact that,  durlng  this  period,  developlng  countries'  exchange
countries...  rates  generally  were extremely  overvalued  and became  increasingly
so,  which  essentially  distorted  the  relative  price  structure  in  these
countries.
MR.  BiANETH:  We have  just  completed  a research  project
looking  at oil-Importing  developing  countrles'  exchange  races  from
1960 to 1984 in real terms [Adrian  Wood, "Global  Trends In Real
Exchange  Ratos,  1960 to 1984",  World Bank Discussion  Papers, 35,
1988],  which shows  that  with only a few exceptions  they  were on a
devaluing  trend,  in real terms,  relative  to those  of industrial
countries. And that  Is until  1985  when the  dollar  [began  to fall.]
MR.  LARSEN:  I agree that they were on a devaluing
trend,  but  I believe  that  they  may still  have been  overvalued.
In other words, if the exchange  rate problem is being
corrected,  I think that there  is a significant  potential  for the
developing countries' trade  to  expand but  It  doesn't follow
necessarily  that there is significant  scope for expanding  their
shares  of world  markets  as much  as Japan  expanded  its  share  of the
world market  previously  or as the Asian  ;JIEs  are expanding  their
share  now.
In order  for them to  be able to do that,  it is necessary
that  investment  be  stepped  up  again.  On  my recollection,  IMF  figures
show that  the  investment  ratio  in the  developing  countries  fell very
sharply in the first half of the 1980s compared  to the previous
period.
What  kind  of  policies  are  needed  to  increase  the  investment
ratio again in order to allow these countries  to exploit their
potential  and to  build  up an export  potential?
I think  that  is at least  as important  a question  as the
question  of the  pull  from  the  industrial  countries.
MR. LIPSCHITZ:  Andrea  Boltho  has  raised  the  point  of
whether  we can  get internally-generated  demand  growth  in the  LDCs?
And I think  Steve  Marris  raised the point  of whether  we can get
internally-generated  demand  growth in Europe, given  its current
structure.
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Grovth  in  Flrst, the Issue  in Europe  --  and Germany  has been the
Germany...  focus  of the  discussion  --  Is that,  growth  in  Germany  has  relied  on
export  Impulses  or  fiscal  Impulses  that  could  not  be sustained.  Can
we get Internally-generated  growth,  that  is sustainable  in  Germany?
From where  we are  now, fiscally,  I don't  see that  we can
have government-generated  growth over the longer-run  in Germany.
Therefore  we should seek to get growth lmpulses  that originate
spontaneously  in the private sector.  To  do this, it will be
necessary  to  deregulate  a ver"'  regulated  economy.
It's  not that  I belleve  that there  Is an enormous  amount
of addltional  growth  that  can  be achieved  by  deregulation.  But  only
that the  deregulation  of markets  is the  only thing  I can see that
could  generate  a  higter  rate  of  sustainable  growth  without  relying  on
ever-growing  fiscal  deficits.
If you believe  chat  fiscal  deficits  are self correcting,
look  at the  U.S.  over  the  last  few  years  and  see  if  you  still  believe
it.
The  second point  raised [by  Steve  Marris] in  this
connection  --  and again  here I am looking  at Europe's  contribution
to growth  -i-  s  the exchange rate system, the EMS in particular.
There  Is  the  Idea  that  Germany  rldes  on the  back  of the  EMS.  It  gets
tremendous  competitive  gains;  It  shelters  itself  from  fluctuations  in
the  dollar. This  view,  however,  is Incomplete.
We  have  a  situation  now  where  much  of the  world  is  looking
for a stable nominal anchor --  and there is an apparent desire for
one  hard  currency.  Thus,  we  have  the  interesting  situation  of  every-
one  complaining  about  the  Deutsche  Mark,  yet  the  Swiss,  the  Austrians
and  now the  United  Kingdom  are  pegging  to it and  using this  peg as
their  credible  financial  policy.
If  you  want  a credible  anti-inflationary  threat,  you need
to  peg to a rock;  you  can't  peg to  a marshmallowJ If you say they
should  peg to Italian  monetary  policy,  that  would  be a  marshmallowl
So,  sure,  there  Is  a cost  In  having  a  very  hard  Deutsche  Mark  at the
center  of the EMS, but there is also the benefit of believable
financlal  stability.
The thlrd  point  Is whether  we could  find demand  policies
that  would  generate  stronger  domestic  demand  in  Europe. Well,  what
does  one  want  here? In  1986  and  1987,  terms  of trade  gains  generated
much  additional  purchasing  power  [3  to  4  percent  of  GDP].  These  gains
were  coupled  with tax  cuts  [another  one  percent  of  GDP]  and  yet there
wasn't  much in the  way of  a demand  response.
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Clearly,  there  Is  some  structural  problem  here.  It Is  not
simply  that  households  and corporations  lack  purchasing  power.  but
that they aren't  uslng It.  Thus far, atleast Increases  in real
Income  are  going  malnly  Into  savlng  rather  than  Into  spending. It
seems  to  me this  is  prima  facle  evldence  of  a  structural  problem  that
needs  to  be  addressed  and  corrected.
Prospects  for  MR. MARI$:  Well,  I would love to respond  on Europe
the  European  and Germany,  but  I think  taking  a global  view,  as I said,  I am not
countries...  sure  whether  we may  not  have  to lower  our  expectation  of Europe. It
Is  an interesting  question.
I want to come back to the  global  picture,  and take the
Boltho's  historical  perspective.  You  know,  when  civillzation  was  in
only very small bits across the world, you could have a gold
discovery  or  the  opening  up  of the  West  or  something  like  that. That
was  a dynamic  factor  which  pulled  parts  of the  world  along.
We have  got  a much  bigger  and  more diverse  world  now  and,
therefore,  I think  that it Is more likely  to be ideas  rather  than
events  that  are  going  to  have an important  influence  on the  future.
I  do  believe  that  the  Keynesian  idea  --  you  could  even  have
an historical  determinist's  view  of the  evolution  of the  Keynesian
idea and l think  Boltho  keeps  harking back to this -- p.ayed  an
enormous  part  in the  golden  era  of the  1950s  and  1960s. Like  all  of
these Ideas,  they belong  to an age and point in time,  and they
deteriorate  in value  when they  have been successful,  which is the
case there.
The  developing  Now  I think  that  there  is  a  new  idea;  it  [really]  isn't  new
world...  at  all,  but  Its  day  has  come  in  the  developing  world. It  may  be said
that  it  is  Prebisch  (Raul)  turned  upside  down. It is  that  prices  are
important,  that  there  are  certain  key  macroeconomic  prices  you must
get right.  And we talked  about exchange  rates here.  There is a
complete  revolution,  I think,  in the  recognition  at leaat  among the
establishments  of  almost  all  Latin  American  countries,  really  in  all
countries,  even the  Chinese,  that  governments  should  get  out of the
business  of production.  There is a new view of the division  of
responsibilities.  It's  not  new  to  us,  but  it  is  new to  them. In the
majority  of the  world  it  is  a  new  thought,  that  the  government's  role
is not one of producing  but rather  regulating  or providing  public
goods  and  so  on.
I am enormously  struck  by the  fact that  in Latin  America
import-substitution,  the  old  view,  and the  views  of the  role  of the
state  are completely  discredited,  and that the technocrats  are  all
speaking  the  same  language,  virtually.
WP/BOLTHO/SF:tg49
Latin  Then  that  doesn't  mean that  that  is  the  answer  because  you
America...  have  got to have che  political  stabillty,  you have got to get the
politlcal  establishment  prepared  to have  the  courage  to  follow  this
through. And if  you look  at Latin  America,  you can  see  those  parts
of the world where it is not being carried  out.  I find Mexico
extremely  exclting. There has been a blg change  in Mexico  since
1982,  its [manufactures)  exports  have increased  by 40 percent  [in
1985-87  period].
And  there  is  a  fuindamental  belief  In  the  future  of  some  of
these  [large)  developing  countries,  which is not what you find  in
Europe  Lhese  days. But I think  the  frightening  thing  in a sense  is
that this [rap'd  economic  change]  has been associated  with a move
towards democracy in a  number of  countries.  Democracies  are
extremely  fragile  and  some  of  the  pain  associated  with  switching  frcm
paternalistic  economic  policies  to [a  new mode]  of economic  policy
may be more than  some of these  democracies  can take.  But I maybe
wrong.
But still  I think  there  is  a great  deal  of optimism  about
these  changes;  but that  wouldn't  be enough.  However,  I am still
optimistic  about  the  U.S. The  great  thing  about  the  U.S. is thac  it
is flooded  with people  from all over the world who want to work
extremely  nard,  and  who  are  keeping  wages  down  and  who  work  at  night.
A  large  number  of these  new emigrants  happen to  have high IQs and
they  are  coming  out  of MIT  and  every-where,  winning  all  the  science
prizes. The country  is  just incapable  of being  either  governed  or
regutlated  enough  to  do  great  damage  to  its  Internal  dynamics,  and  it
is  going to survive,  as long  as it keeps  its  macroeconomics  right,
and that  of course  is  a big  consideration.
Now  this  leads  me to  the  question  of  coordination.  I  find
myself  extremely  uneasy  with  what  I  regard  as  idealized  sort  of  views
that emerge  from the papers  presented  here and from some of the
things  said.  Perhaps  if  we are lucky,  we will  need a more or less
1930s'  recession  to lead  to  a situation  in  which  we could  do  a major
rebuilding  of  the  institutional  and  political  structure  necessary  for
coordination. At the  moment,  I don't think that is what we are
headed  for.  So it's going to be much more messy, a bit-by-bit
business.
Yen/dollar  One element  in  it  I think  is  emerging,  which  is  that  there
liaison...  will be a Yen/dollar  liaison. Lately  [early  19881,  the relations
between  the  U.S.  and  Japan  have  become  so integrated  that  it is  very
likely  that  the  political  interests  on both  sides  will  be sufficient
to lead to a situation  in which both countries  are prepared  to do
whatever  is  necessary  to  prevent  that  exchange  rate  from  fluctuating
as It has in the past.  If that were true,  an awful lot of the
developing  world  is  going  to  forget  about  Europe  and is  going  to  peg




You  could  have  an optimistic  scenario  for  Europe. I said
I  had  written  it  off,  but  I  wouldn't  entirely.  First,  taking  Germany
itself,  you  know thls  rock  onto  which  Europe  has locked  itself  was.
I argued,  very  valuable  in the  flrst  half of the  1980s.  It is  now
like  a rock  wh.ch  Is  being  tied  to  somebody's  leg  and  they  have  been
thrown  Into the  river,  and, they  have to decide  whether  they are
golng  to  untie  It  or not.
More  on  There  are two things. One is that  I think  there  is one
Europe...  factLon  in Germany  which  has not accepted  the  view, the  generally
depressed  view, of future slow growth.  When I  talk to German
businessmen,  they  don't  accept  the  Idea that they  are condemned  to
technological  backwardness  and  to  the  loss  of  all  their  world  markets
and all the  rest  of it.  Indeed,  they  are not yet technologically
backward. So far they  are  not too  worried  or they  haven't  been  for
the  last  twelve  months  because  they  have  been  wiping  up the  rest  of
Europe. But I believe  that the  reaction  from the  German  business
community,  if  and  when  EMS  breaks  down,  will  be virulent.
The  other  thing  is  that  there  is  one  ambitious  country  left
in  Europe  and  that  is  France. And  I  just  don't  think  France  is  going
to  sit  down  and tie  itself  to this  pessimistic  view  of the  world. I
am  extremely  impressed  by  the  very  substantial  structural  improvement
that  is taking  place  in the  French  economy. Profits  are  up; infla-
tion  is down.  There  has been  an immense  amount  of restructuring.
There  is  a lot  of technological  change  going  on.
Now,  there  are  problems  like  the  French  educational  system
and  a  good  many  other  things. But  I don't  think  that  Europe  Is  going
to  go  down  the  drain  without  at  least  trying,  and  I think  it  is  going
to  be  very  interesting  to  see  whether  it  could  put its  act together,
which  wlll  be very  difficult.
A  more  managed  To sum up,  I think  that  it is reasonable  to  suppose  that
financial  the troubles  we are going to go through in the short-run  will
system...  generate  enough  of a move to a somewhat  more managed financial
system,  and that  is now  a new standard  or fixed  rates  or even  John
Williamson's  target  zones. It  may be  something  much  more pragmatic
than  that,  which is the  sort  of agreement  between  the  President  of
the  United  States  and the  Prime  Minister  of  Japan,  that  we  will  work
together  on this  and there  may be  some  point  at  which the  Europeans
come  rushing  in  and say, "Hey,  we would  like  to join in this too",
which  is what  happened,  of course,  when the "Group  of Two" started
meeting.  Thus, the  ideal  outcome  is enough  trouble  ahead to make
sure that  the  lessons  have  been  learned  and that  we  get the  minimum
necessary  degree  of greater  financial  stability.
Furthermore,  if we look  at what can  be done,  or is being
done,  in terms  of  policy  reforms  we may  revise  our view  of the  link
between  the  developed  and the  (developing].  The interesting  thing
is that  [it  used  to  be the  case  that]  with  good  growth  in the  North,
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we (had]  good growth  in the  South,  even In parts  of Latin  America
when they  ware  following  the  most  awful  policies.
Now  it  may  well  be that  with less  good  growth  in the  North
but  wlth  better  policies  In the  de7eloping  countries,  they  can  grow
just  as well if  not  better. The  world  is  changing. It may  well be
that (developing  countries]  will become  the  dynamic  force  which is
helping  us along,  not necessarily  immediately,  but if considering
twenty  years  out, it  seems  perfectly  possible.
MR.  BANETH:  I  would  like  the  IECAP  representatives  to
answer  on the  specific  technical  questions  on the  investment  ratios
and the  linkages  in the  projections.
MR. FARDOUST:  The historical  figures  on investment
ratios  for  the  developing  countries,  partlcularly  for  the  1980s,  are
heavily  influenced  by the  performance  of China  and  India.
For  many countries,  however,  there  has been  an extraordi-
nary decline  in the investment  ratios.  The disaggregated  figures
show  a  collapse  in  Latin  America  and  Sub-Saharan  Africa  in  the  early
1980s,  while,  by and  large,  the  East  Asian  countries  --  even  if one
excludes  China  --  maintained  their  investment  ratios. Our baseline
projections  show that If real Interest  rates begin to decline  and
world  trade  and  commodity  prices  recover  in the  next  few  years,  both
imports  and  investment  ratios  in  many  developing  countries  will  begin
to improve  in the  1990s.
More  on the  MR.  ARMINGTON:  On the  question  of the  linkage  between
North-South  export  volume  growth  of the  developing  countries  and GDP growth  of
linkage...  the  Industrial  countries,  I  have  a  couple  of points  to  make.  Basic-
ally,  our  projections  of  developing  country  exports  come  from  our  so-
called  central  case,  which essentially  is a report  on the Country
Economists'  Survey [the long-term  survey of  the Bank's country
specialists.]
Looking  at historical  data,  as Andrew  Steer  pointed  out,
our  baseline  projections  for  export  volume  growth  of  4.2  percent  tper
annum)  from  1986  to 1995,  for  developing  countries,  looks  a bit  high
developing  in  relation  to either  their  GDP  growth  of 4.0  percent  [per  annum]  or
countries'  real  GDP growth  of industrial  countries  of 2.5 - 2.8 percent [per
exports...  annum]. That is the  point  at issue  here.
That  figure  of 4.2  percent  essentially  is the  aggregation
of  what  the  country  economists  say  is,  in  effect,  their  export  supply
forecast,  given the  policy  sets  that  they  are  assuming. It is  also
heavily  weighted  by the  export  performance  of the  NIEs.
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HR.  BAmEH:  The  crucial  question  is  whether  the  pattern
of Imports,  whlch  will  prevail  In industrlal  countries  in  the  1990s,
wlll be broadly that of the 1950s/1960s  when they had imports
Increasing  at  about  the  same  rate  as  GNVP,  or  of the  1970s  and  indeed,
give  or take  a  few  periods,  1980s,  where  Imports  into  the  industrial
countrles  were  Increasing  much  faster  than  GDP; and  whether  you  can
have a continuatlon  of that pattern  of rapidly  increasing  imports
with relatively  slower  GDP growth.  Is that compatible  wich the
polltics  and  economics  of the  case?
MR.  ARI  :  The  baseline  scenario  for  the  industrial
countrles,  showing  output  growth  of 2.5 - 2.8 percent  in the  next
decade,  Is probably  a fairly  pessimistic  scenario,  particularly  in
light  of llberalization  policies  that  may  be in the  pipeline.
So It could  very  well be, as Mr. Larsen  and others  have
suggested,  that  sufficiently  favorable  domestic  policies,  support-
Ing export  growth  well in the  developing  countries,  could  overcome
all  evils  and  produce  export  growth  in excess  of 4 percent. It is
really  possible.
MR. LARSEN:  With this  kind  of growth  projection  for
the  Industrial  countries  and  developing  countries,  assuming  that  you
would  have  world  trade  growing  by  something  like  4,  4.5  percent,  your
export  projection  for  the  developing  countries  i.mplies  that  they  will
barely  maintain their market shares today,  which I should have
thought  Is  highly  unlikely.
MR. BANETH:  I chink  you  have to separate  this  between
manufactures,  where they have been consistently  increasing  their
market  shares,  and  primary  commodities,  where  trade  is  growing  less
fast than  overall  trade  and the  effects  are  differentiated.
PROFESSOR  BOLTHO:  Onto  the  longer-run  now.  The  purpose
of  this meeting, I  think, to some extent was  to see what the
prospects  for  growth  to  the  end  of the  century  were likely  to  be.  I
am  not  sure  that  much  consensus  has  been  reached. Mr.  Baneth  will  be
summlng  up later,  but let  me suggest  a couple  of points  thac  have
been  made  or might  be relevant.
Long-run  Basically,  the issue  was about OECD, but Stephen  Marris
prospects  for  has  made  several  very  important  and  interesting  comments  on the  LDCs.
growth  and the  I  think  he  would  agree,  however  that  even  if  the  LDCs'  growth  goes  on
LOCs...  being  relatively  rapid  and  possibly  accelerates,  any  feedback  on the
industrial  countries  will  have  to  wait  for the  next  century. For  the
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world  economy  as  a  whole  thls  cannot  be all  that  significant  through
the  next ten  years. It  will  be  good  for  the  LDCs,  but  not  much  more
than  that.
When It comes to the industrial  countrles,  apart  from a
remark  by Harris  at one  stage,  which  he didn't  follow  up,  according
to which in fact he was rather  optimistic  and  he thought  that the
1990s,  once transition  Is  over,  could  generate  fairly  rapid  growth,
(four  percent  growth,  I think  was  a figure  that  was  suggested)  most
of the  other  comments  have been  actually  fairly  gloomy.
On  the  one  hand,  Flemmlng  Larsen,  suggested  the  inevitabil-
ity  of 2.5  percent  because  of the  historical  record. Several  other
people,  including  myself,  were probably  pessimistic  not because  of
inevitability  but  because  we  saw  that  the  probability  of a  recesslon,
perhaps not serious enough to generate a  new  consensus and a
completely  reformed  International  monetary  system,  butt  serious  enough
to erode  confidence  yet  further  --  a bit  like the  1974-75  recession
generated  a lower  growth  path,  which  then  was  lowered  further  because
of the  1980-82  recession.
A new recession  in 1989,  1990,  1991 could  have a further
negative  effect  on investment  propensities,  on  confidence  and  so  on.
Now  that is taking  the gloomiest view, which would really limit the
industrial  countries'  growth  in the  1990s  to two  percent  or possibly
less.
There  may  be  compensating  effects  here. There  may  particu-
larly  be the  much greater  dynamism  of Japan  and the  United  States
vis-a-vis  Europe,  so that  Europe  sinks  even further,  Japan  and the
United States  manage a good deal better.  I don't think that a
consensus  has been reached  at this meeting that for the OECD we
should  be  expecting  much  more  than  2.5  percent  [growth  per  annum)  for
whatever  reason. The  LDC's  may be a different  story.
MR.  BANETH: I  don't  think  we  have  on the  whole  the  feeling
that  innovation  and  technological  change  are  going  to  be  bottlenecks
for  future  growth. So to  come to  Boltho's  issue  of  whether  there  is
a physical  constraint  on growth  in the  industrial  countries,  we may
disagree  as to  how  much that  constituted  a constraint  in the  1980s.
But I think the general feeling  here is that it will not be a
constraint  in the  1990s.
Nev  growth  In  I think  we see, some of us with greater strength  than
the  U.S....  others,  several  institutional  constraints.  Perhaps  the  most  optimis-
tic  view  is that  somehow  new  growth  will emerge  in the  U.S.,  because
of its national  dynamism,  and in Japan and developing  countries.
Whether  these  impulses  will  support  a higher  growth  in  Europe,  that
is a problem  for the  Europeans;  but they really  will constitute  a
fairly  dynamic  growth  in the  1990s  for the rest of the  world.  I
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think we have seen that there is general consensus  that widely
gyratlng real  interest and  exchange rates have  constituted  a
constraint  on Investment.
But there  is [alsol  a  consensus  that something  needs be
done  to  stabilize  exchange  rates  to  some  extent,  at least  to  get the
Investment  going,  to  boost  confldence  of private  Investors.
The issue  of  I don't think we have handled very much the issue of
the  huge  financial  mechanism. Is there  a need for such  a huge surpluses  by
surpluses...  some  countries? Some  of these  economies  are  fairly  strongly  geared
to such surpluses. I think  Boltho  kept  referrlng  to thls  sort of
mechanism  in  Asian  NIEs.  There  Is  perhaps  also  a broader  mechanism
of the  sort  at  play  in  Europe  and  Japan. And  If  you  need  surpluses,
you need deficits;  you need, in some sense,  solvable  deficlts  to
compensate  for the surpluses.  We will have to consider  further
whether  the  Triffinian  dilemma,  enlarged  to  the  world  economy  and to
a  different  system,  is stlll  plagulng  us.  I happen  to  believe  that
it is.
Despite  the  insistence  placed  on the  remaining  structural
constraints,  I  do  not  think  we  got  very  much,  in  terms  of the  growing
structural  rigiditLes  having  caused  the  slowdown. I think  what some
are  saying,  is  that  removing  some  of  the  remaining  or  existing  struc-
tural  rigidities,  is  one  of  the  few  places  where  one  can  get  a  boost.
I  wouldn't  disagree  with  that;  I  don't  think  anybody  would  disagree
with it even if  we might  discuss  how  much of a boost  it  will  give.
I don't think  we had very  much support  for the theory  that  somehow
these  rigidities  were  mounting  and  that  is  what  caused  the  slowdown.
Problems  with  I think  there  would  be  general  agreement  with  a character-
2.5  percent  ization  that  one  needs  lots  of  good  conditions.  For  fast growth  one
nsolution"...  needs  a good shock  to initiate  it,  and then  one needs  lots  of good
developments  for  the  growth  process  to  continue.  And  if  any  one  of
these  good  conditions  disappears,  one  will  have  a much  slower  growth.
And  because  one needs  lots  of them,  the  general  feeling,
with the  possible  exception  of Marris,  thinking  about the  recovery
period,  is that  we are not likely  --  to come back to growth  rates
well  in  excess  of  2.5  percent  in  the  medium-run  --  unless  some  policy
yet to be  characterized  and  defined  emerges. It  is  not  a  conclusion
of the  discussion,  but  my own  intimate  conviction,  that  2 percent  is
not  a stable  outcome.
I don't  believe  that  politically  and  socially  for  Europe,
but  also  for the  rest  of the  world,  in  some  sense,  that  is  a stable
outcome. I don't  think  that  whatever  is left  of the  international
economic  system,  including  some  free  flow  of capital,  and to  a very
limited  extent  of labor,  and to  a very  marked  extent  of goods,  will
survive,  over the  medium-run  under the  social,  political  pressures
of  that  slow  growth  rate.
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So, In effect,  whlle in an economic  sense  I see that  as
belng  the  most  likely  outcome,  and  nothing  which  we have  sald  during
this  meetlng  changed  that  feellng,  I thlnk  the  2.5  percent  outcome
Is  not  golng  to  work over  the  1990s.
I see the consequences  of  a slowdown,  of  the recession,
both socially  and politically,  for countrles  which now have 10
percent  unemployment;  for  a trade  system  which  now  Is under  serious
stress  as contrasting  to  a sort  of dynamic  momentum  in the  1960s,  I
see the  consequences  of  the  slowdown  for the  developing  countries,
where  the  debt  problem  has  been  heavy  for  the  past  seven  years,  where
democratic  regimes  are  under  heavy  pressure. So  I  see  that  the
recession  could have much more severe  consequences  than perhaps
Boltho  Is  forecasting.
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